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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, I study microeconometrics and its applications in empirical questions.
There are three studies, which investigate the housing vacancy rate, sticky demand, and
the quantile forecasting methods for time series data.
In the first study, I use a mixture density model to estimate the housing vacancy rate
of 15.85% from housing-units level electricity consumption data. This high vacancy rate
reflects the high volumes of investment demands in the Chinese housing market.
In the second study, I relax a fundamental assumption in the literature of dynamic
pricing, from regular demand to sticky demand and investigate the related economics out-
comes.
In the third study, I extend a novel nonparametric quantile forecasting method that
is from being only applicable to i.i.d data to being more general applicable that allows
for weakly dependent time series data. The simulated and empirical data illustrated the
efficiency gain of my method over other existing nonparametric methods.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Econometric methods for empirical questions have been the constant topics in the liter-
ature. I develop the novel econometric methods and apply them to answer microeconomics
questions. This thesis is organized as following:
In Chapter 1, I propose a novel identification strategy to estimate the housing vacancy
rate of 15.85% from housing-units level electricity usage data. Our identification strategy
complements the conventional methods when people don’t have survey data. This chapter
also offers an alternative approach to assess the over-supply risks. Rather than unsold units
from newly build housing flows, the households investment housing stocks rise more con-
cerns and have been mostly unexplored in the literature. I offer solid empirical evidence
that the strong investment demands existing in the Chinese housing market. These in-
vestment properties could hit the market and put more pressure on downward price when
housing price decrease since the supply of vacant houses are more elastic than that of
occupied ones.
In Chapter 2, The literature on dynamic pricing assumes that consumer demand re-
sponds to any changes in price. Recent advances in economics, however, have suggested
that consumers may be rationally inattentive and not respond to small price changes, re-
sulting in demand stickiness. We explicitly model the implications of this sticky demand
on firm’s pricing behaviors. Using a large dataset consisting of eight years of weekly gro-
cery retail data, we estimate the magnitude of demand stickiness and demonstrate how the
estimates vary with consumer demographics and product characteristics. Furthermore, we
conduct a counterfactual analysis demonstrating the profit improvement a retailer could
enjoy by taking into account this demand stickiness when dynamically setting prices to
clear inventory.
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In Chapter 3, I consider the problem of forecasting a conditional quantile function in a
nonparametric framework with time series data. We prove the consistency and asymptotic
normality of our nonparametric conditional quantile estimator for absolutely regular pro-
cesses (β-mixing) data generating processes. We derive the asymptotic distribution of our
proposed estimator and conduct Monte Carlo experiments to compare the finite sample
performance of our estimator and traditional check function based estimator. Simulation
results show that our estimator outperforms the check function based estimator in terms of
out-of-sample forecasting. We also apply the estimation method to forecast monthly U.S.
housing return based on S&P/Case-Shiller House Price Indices and compare the fore-
casting results with those obtained by using a commonly used linear conditional quantile
model and by using conventional check function based nonparametric conditional quantile
estimator. Our estimator forecast well compared to these competitors, especially for data
in the tail regions.
2
2. IDENTIFYING HOUSING VACANCY RATE FROM ELECTRICITY BILLS
The vacancy rate has been the great interest to housing market as being the key factor
to assess the supply and demand conditions and related risks on the market. Its importance
and related policy implications have been discussed in [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. Most of the
existing works focus on the vacancy rate of rental market in a mature economy, like US and
UK. However, not much works can be found that estimate the home owner vacancy rate
in the emerging or transitional economies. Among these emerging economies, China has
attracted particularly concerns and attentions from scholars and policy makers worldwide.
The fast growing housing market of China puts more risks on itself and global economy
than that of other mature economies.
Over the last decade, China has experienced an extraordinary successful housing mar-
ket. Based on National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC) data, the real estate industry
and the related sectors accounted around 13 percent for national output of China, which
has the second largest economy in the world and been the major contributor to the world
economic stability since 2008. Also, the housing price maintained real annual growth rate
at 17 percent since 2004 [9]. While accompanied with this rapid growth rate of housing
market, the average real GDP growth rate is about 10% and average real disposable in-
come growth rate is 9% during that period. As the Chinese economy starts to slow down
since 2013, people worry about China would follow the steps of 2008 U.S and 1990s
Japan. The crash of the housing booms of U.S and Japan severely damage their domestic
economy, which have the contagious effects on global economy. Even more concerns of
Chinese housing market are rising after a new wave of price hikes from 2015 to 2016. For
example, the housing price of Shenzhen, one of major cities of China, grew 51.9% from
Jan, 2015 to Jan, 2016. This persistent faster than economic fundamentals growth also
3
generates a series of social inequality problems. The high income households own mul-
tiple houses [10], while, the average families suffer from the huge financial burden from
acquiring their homes [11].
The soaring housing price has been attributed to the insufficient supply. The Chinese
housing market seems following this logic in the sense that the amount of sold housing
areas is increase 10 times from 165.7 millions square meters at 2000 to 1,052 millions
square meters at 2014. For easing the fast growing price, the central government planed to
build 36 millions welfare housing units nation wide from 2011 to 2015 and actually built
around 39 millions housing units. However, even with this kind of effort, the housing price
keeps going up. Therefore, the underpinning reasons for the high housing price is beyond
the seemingly insufficient supply logic.
It’s important and urgent to identify the reasons of this ongoing unhealthy growth
and to assess the potential risks of housing market crash in China. The recent news and
research papers [12] have showed the growing number of unsold housing properties from
newly built housing flows in urban areas. However, the vacant units of housing stocks have
been exclusively unexplored in the literature. Due to the nascent nature and data limitation
of Chinese housing market, it’s challenging to estimate the home owner vacancy rate,
which is the leading indicator of the Chinese housing market. The existing works about
Chinese housing market vacancy rate draw diverge conclusions on the exact number of
vacancy rate. All the existing works are based on the descriptive statistics from survey
data. Perhaps, the most widely accepted data set on vacancy rate is the China Household
Finance Survey (CHFS) from Southwestern Unviersity of Finance and Economics ([10]).
This survey reports the nation wide vacancy rate of 22.4% at 2013 based on the information
that the number of housing units each household have from a sample of 28,000 households
under the presumption that each household can not occupy more than one housing unit
simultaneously. However, [13] reports a much lower vacancy rate of 5.3% at 2009 based
4
on the housing units owning and occupying information from Urban Household Survey
data from NBSC.
All the existing works estimate the vacancy rate from survey data. However, as com-
monly acknowledge, the survey data demands more resources to collect than the trans-
action data and being rare for developing countries. In this paper, we propose an alter-
native identification strategy, which complements the conventional vacancy rate estima-
tion method and offers an option when people don’t have the survey data. The data set
consists of 1.2 million housing units electricity usage information from one of the most
populated and economically important cities of China. Under the assumption that va-
cant housing units should have zero or low electricity consumption, we propose a mixture
density model to estimate the housing vacancy rate. First, we focus on the non-zero elec-
tricity consumption households. We find out that there are two peaks in the non-zero
consumption households PDF graph, one peak at very low electricity consumption, 73
kilowatts-hour/year, and another one at household normal electricity consumption, 1558
kilowatts-hour/year. Among the non-zero electricity consumption housing units, We as-
sume that one type housing units with low electricity consumption are occasionally visited
by owner and be vacant for most of the time, and another type housing units with normal
electricity consumption are dwelling units that are occupied by households. Thus, each
of the housing units types have their own underlying electricity usage distributions and
a mixture density model could be applied to identify each of them. Second, with 8.27%
zero-electricity consumption of total sample observations, we find the percentage of hous-
ing units with low electricity consumption is 7.15%. After re-scale, the vacancy rate is
15.85%, which is lower than the CHFS survey reported nation wide 22.4% at 2013, but
much higher than the [13] reported 5.3% at 2009. Since our results are based on one of
the most populated cities, which have the highest housing price and are widely assumed
to have the lowest vacancy rate in the nation, a higher vacancy rate is expected on national
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level. We should also note that the home owner vacancy rate was 2.5% at United States
even during the peak of 2007 U.S housing boom based on American Housing Survey.
This vacancy rate indicates a massive part of Chinese households purchasing hous-
ing units as investment vehicles and leave them vacant, which reflect the high investment
demands [14] on the Chinese housing market. The fast growing housing price generates
tremendous amounts of housing market capital gains, which stimulated the investment
motives on the market and being maintained by the household’s high expectations of fu-
ture income and economy growth. The same phenomenon, homeowners momentum, also
happened during the 2002-2006 U.S housing boom. [15] empirically find out that more
people would like to own a house as housing price keeps going up. Our estimated vacancy
rate offers important economic insights for identifying the risks of Chinese housing market
crash. Under the assumption that the vacant housing units are more elastic than occupied
ones, the households are very likely to sell their vacant houses on secondary market once
housing price decrease, which generate a serious risks of housing market crash. Given
the fact that the Chinese central government planed massive welfare housing construction
project since 2011, this risk could be even amplified as the economy growth slows down.
The policy implication of this paper helps reconciling the debate on whether people
should levy the property tax in China to ease the fast growing housing price. Even though
there has been constant debate over the degree of property taxes capitalization, the public
finance literature widely accepted that the property taxes can be partially capitalized into
home values [16, 17, 18, 19]. In more recent studies, [20] confirms that tax on vacant units
reduces the vacancy in French rental housing market. Intuitively, the housing values, like
any other asset values, should equal to the present value of housing flows from owning
it. The property tax will increase the housing holding cost, which lead to a lower home
values. As many of the existing studies showed, the property tax can effectively reduce the
housing capital gains. For easing the identified investment demands and soaring housing
6
price, we suggest that China should levy the property tax.
2.1 Institutional Background
The Chinese housing market is still nascent as the houses were not commercialized
until 1998. Before then, the residential properties were allocated by the employment re-
lationship between state-owned working units and employees. The working units assign
various sizes and locations of housing units to their employees depending on the length of
employment and size of households, among other factors, as parts of employment benefit
package. In 1998, with the progress of economic reform and privatization since 1978,
the traditional housing allocation mechanism was terminated and the "commodity houses"
and "welfare houses" were introduced. Similar to western countries housing systems, the
price of "commodity houses" is determined by the market and the "welfare houses" are
supposed to be assigned to low or medium income households. Since then, the housing
price start to soar with both the strong demand and strong supply of residential housing.
In order to understand the supply and demand metrics better, we firstly look at the
economic fundamentals in China. As well known, China has experienced an spectacular
economic growth in recent decades with an average annual real GDP growth rate about
10 percent. However, we should note that there are two drops in GDP growth as shown
in figure 2.1. The first one is a sharp drop happened between 2008 and 2009 mainly
because of the 2008 financial recession that originated from U.S and spread world wide
rapidly. For preventing the economy sharp drop from this recession, the Chinese central
government initiated a timely comprehensive 580 billions U.S dollars stimulus package,
which invested a substantial proportion to the real estate sector. The more concerning
drop happened at 2013 as the slowest economic growth rate of 7.1 in recent 20 years,
which makes the public concern the crash of Chinese housing market boom.
Accompanied with economic growth, the urbanization process in China experienced a
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steady growth. The urban population grows from 460 millions at 2000 to 750 millions at
2014 with average growth rate of 3.56.
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Figure 2.1: GDP Growth
The newly built housing areas grows from 244 millions square meters at 2000 ti 1248
millions square meters at 2014 with average annual growth rate of 13.2%. As shown on
the figure 2.2, the housing supply keeps increasing even during the 2008 recession time.
We think that is mainly because of the comprehensive stimulus package during that time.
While, the supply start to fluctuate, but stays high, since the Chinese economy slowing
down of 2012. In addition, targeting on continuously rising price and inequality problems,
the central government launched the welfare housing program to increases the housing
supply. The most remarkable welfare housing project was initiated by the he Ministry of
Housing and Urban-Rural Development at 2011 to offer 36 million welfare housing units
nation wide within 5 years. According to the recent government reports, the actual number
of completed welfare housing units is 39.7 million by the end of 2015.
The sold housing areas grow from 165 millions square meters at 2000 ti 1052 millions
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Figure 2.2: New Build
square meters at 2014 with average annual growth rate of 15.4%. As shown in the figure
2.3, there are only two decreasing episodes during the period of study, which coincide with
two drops of GDP growth. First demand decreasing happened during 2008 financial reces-
sion time, but recovered soon and increased faster than before as the central government
stimulus package took effect. Another decreasing happened at 2014 as two years after the
Chinese economy starts to slow down.
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Figure 2.3: Annual Demand
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The property tax, as one of the primary tax sources for local governments in many
developed countries, has not been levied in China yet. As an alternative tax source, the land
sale revenue largely support the Chinese local governments for public goods provisions
given all the land is owned by government in China. Therefore, the local governments
have incentives to sell the land for a higher price, and these incentives transfer to housing
prices as well. Given the decade long Chinese housing market booming, there is a heated
nationwide debate that whether the central government should levy the property tax for
easing the soaring housing price . The pro side argues that the property tax can relive the
local government from land sales and con side argues that the property tax could crowd
out the household consumption [21]. In order to preparing for the potential tax reform,
the government initiated the pilot property tax trials in January 2011. These trails were
implemented in Shanghai and Chongqing, where are two important and representative
cities of east side and west side of China. They provide good policy experimental results
for analyzing the impact of property tax on housing prices. [22] and [23] find out the
negative relationship between the incidence of property tax trials and the housing price.
In Shanghai, the property tax was targeting at multiple housing units owners. For
households with Shanghai municipal residential registration (hukou), they pay 0.6% tax
rate for housing properties other than their primary dwelling housing unit in general. The
tax rate can reduce to 0.4% if their housing properties are cheaper than twice the average
housing price of residential homes at city level. The tax exemption is 60 square meters
per household member. In Chongqing, the property tax was targeting at luxury housing
properties. The tax rate is 0.5% for housing properties with price lower than around 2000
U.S dollars per square meter and increase to anywhere between 1% and 1.2% for hous-
ing properties with price higher than that. The tax exemption is 180 square meters for
independent house and 100 square meters for apartments.
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2.2 Model and Estimation
We build a mixture density model to identify the different types of housing usages
from a set of electricity bill data such that the housing vacancy rate could be recovered.
Let x denote the 2014 electricity bill of an apartment from this major city in China.
There are three different cases to generalize the housing situations:
(i) the apartment is fully occupied so that x is a draw from an unknown distribution
with a positive housing electricity consumption.
(ii) x may be a very small number suggesting that this apartment is basically vacant in
2014, the owner may occasionally visit the apartment, say, for a regular weekly or monthly
check.
(iii) x may be zero meaning that this apartment was completely vacant during 2014
(sold un-decorated apartments exist in the Chinese housing market so that no one can
possibly live there).
We use H1, H2 and H0 to denote the numbers of housing units for cases (i), (ii) and
(iii), respectively, then the housing vacancy rate for the city is defined as
V R =
H2 +H0
H1 +H2 +H0
The information on H0 is available from the data. The difficulty is to identify H2 from
H1 + H2. Let x1 and x2 be random draws of electricity consumption from type (i) and
type (ii) apartments, and F1(·) and F2(·) be their cumulative distribution functions with
probability density functions f1(·) and f2(·), respectively. Conditional on x > 0, we use
p to denote the percentage of apartments that belong to type (i), and 1 − p denote the
percentage of apartments that belong to type (ii). Also, let p0 denote the percentage of
apartments from type (iii).
To identify/estimate p, we propose a mixture density for positive electricity consump-
11
tion (x > 0).
f(x|θ) = p f1(x|θ) + (1− p) f2(x|θ) (2.1)
The parameter of interest p and other relevant parameters θ will be estimated by maximiz-
ing the following summation of log likelihood function:
L =
N∑
i=1
`i(θˆ) (2.2)
where `i(θˆ) = logf(xi|θˆ)
Denote total number of housing units H = H0 + H1 + H2, We have p0 = H0H , p =
H1
H1+H2
, 1 − p = H2
H1+H2
. Since both p and 1 − p are conditional on X > 0, we need to
re-scale them with factor H1+H2
H
to compute the vacancy rate V R. We denote probability
of being type (ii) households as p2 = (1− p)H1+H2H = H2H1+H2 H1+H2H = H2H . Then, we have
V R = p0 + p2 (2.3)
2.3 Data and Empirical Results
We have data of electricity bills (in 2014) about 1.2 million units of apartments, which
are already sold to households and registered in electricity companies. We trim out data
with X > 10, 000 (kilowatts-hour). There are several reasons that one may want to trim
out extreme tail observations. First, very large electricity consumption units could be
super luxury residential units, which are not the interest of this paper. Second, extreme
tail observation can have influential impact on estimation results. Removing data with
x > 10, 000 drops 4726 observations, which are less than 0.5% of the total observations.
In addition, there are 103, 546 observations with x = 0, which is about 8.7% of the sample.
After remove data for both x = 0 and for x > 10, 000, we obtain a sample n = 1, 090, 898.
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The raw data histogram is plotted in figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.4: Raw Data Histogram
We start with a mixture of normal distribution model for benchmark estimation pur-
pose. The normal distribution is the most popular distribution assumption in the literature
and the two peaks in figure 2.4 seem to could be captured by a mixture of two normal
distribution.
A Normal density function has the following form.
n(x|µ, σ2) = 1
σ
√
2pi
e−
(x− µ)2
2σ2
, 0 < x <∞. (2.4)
We assume that a random draw from positive x, it is a draw from n(x|µ1, σ21) with
probability p, and from n(x|µ2, σ22) with probability 1− p, Therefore, the mixture normal
density function for x is given by
fn(x) = p n(x|µ1, σ21) + (1− p)n(x|µ2, σ22), (2.5)
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where n(x|µ1, σ21) is defined in (2.4). We estimate the parameters p, µj , σj for j = 1, 2 by
the maximum likelihood method and the results is presented in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Two Normal Mixed Estimation Results
Parameter p 1− p µ1 σ21 µ2 σ22
Values 0.15 0.85 3.16∗103 1.7∗103 1.13∗103 715
We plot the mixture of normal density with larger mean in figure 2.5, with smaller
mean in figure 2.6, and the entire mixture of two normal densities in 2.7. We compare the
mixture of two normal densities with raw data histogram in figure 2.8. We found out that
the two normal density mixture can only capture one of the peaks, which is the one with
larger mean value and larger variance picking up the fat tail of x.
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Figure 2.5: The Normal Density Mixture P.D.F with Larger Mean
Since the Normal density mixtures can not capture the observations, we propose a
mixture of Gamma density to capture the shape of raw data. A Gamma density function
14
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000
×10-3
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
Figure 2.6: The Normal Density Mixture P.D.F with Smaller Mean
has the following form:
g(x, α, β) =
1
Γ(α)βα
xα−1e−x/β, 0 < x <∞, α > 0, β > 0. (2.6)
There are several reasons for using Gamma densities to describe electricity consump-
tion. First, x > 0 is satisfied as there cannot be negative electricity consumption. Second,
when 0 < α < 1, the gamma density function has a large peak at x = 0, which can be
used to describe electricity consumption for type (ii) houses; when α > 1, the Gamma
density function takes value 0 at x = 0 and it is peaked at x = (α − 1)/β > 0, which can
be used to model electricity consumption for “non-vacant or occupied houses”. Therefore,
Gamma distribution has a much longer fat tail than normal distribution does.
We assume that a random draw from positive x, it is a draw from g(x, α1, β1) with
probability p, and from g(x, α2, β2) with probability 1 − p. Thus, the mixture of gamma
density function for x is given by
fg(x) = p g(x, α1, β1) + (1− p) g(x, α2, β2), (2.7)
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Figure 2.7: Two Normal Densities Mixture
where the Gamma density function g(x, α, β) is defined in (2.6). We estimate the param-
eters p, αj , βj for j = 1, 2 by the maximum likelihood method.
We present the estimation results in table 2.3, plot the estimated p.d.f and compare
it with raw data histogram in figure 2.9. We observe that the estimated Gamma density
traces the histogram’s shape quite well.
We know that if x ∼ Gamma-distribution with pdf fg(x, α, β), then E(x) = αβ and
Std(β) =
√
αβ2. Using the estimated parameters, we see that E(x1) = (2.05)(760) =
1558 and Std(x1) = 1088; while E(x2) = 73.0 and Std(x2) = 82.4. The average
electricity consumption for type (ii) houses is less than 5% of that of type (i) houses.
Indicating that these houses were only occasionally visited by their owners and therefore
are very likely to be ‘vacant houses’.
Table 2.2: Two Gamma Mixed Estimation Results
Parameter p 1− p α1 β1 α2 β2 µ1 σ21 µ2 σ22
Values 0.922 0.078 2.05 760.0 0.785 93.0 1558 1088 73 82.4
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Figure 2.8: Two Normal Densities Mixture and Raw Data Comparison
For model selection, we use the [24] method. We conduct the non-nested likelihood
ratio test on the mixture of normal model and the mixture of Gamma model. The null
hypothesis is that the likelihood of the mixture of Gamma distributions equals to that of
the mixture of normal distribution.
Let fg(x|θ1) and fn(x|θ2) be competing models for the density of D(xi), where both
may be misspecified. Let θˆ1 and θˆ2 be the QMLEs converging to θ∗1 and θ
∗
2. Let Lm =∑N
i=1 `im(θˆm) be the quasi-log likelihood evaluated at the relevant estimate for m = n, g.
Then
N−1/2(L1 − L2) = N−1/2
N∑
i=1
[`i1(θˆ1)− `i2(θˆ2)]
= N−1/2
N∑
i=1
[`i1(θ
∗
1)− `i2(θ∗2)] + op(1) (2.8)
Under the null hypothesis H0 : E[`i1(θ∗1)] = E[`
∗
i2(θ
∗
2)],
N−1/2
N∑
i=1
[`i1(θˆ1)− `i2(θˆ2)]→ N(0, η2) (2.9)
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Figure 2.9: Two Gamma Densities Mixture and Raw Data Comparison
where η2 = var(`i1(θ∗1)− `i2(θ∗2)). A consistent estimator of η2 is
ηˆ2 ≡ N−1
N∑
i=1
[`i1(θˆ1)− `i2(θˆ2)]2 (2.10)
Vuong’s model non-nested test statistic is
VMS = N−1/2(L1 − L2)/ηˆ
=
N−
1
2
∑N
i=1[`i1(θˆ1)− `i2(θˆ2)]
{N−1∑Ni=1[`i1(θˆ1)− `i2(θˆ2)]2}1/2 → N(0, 1) (2.11)
under H0.
A simple way to obtain a valid test is to define dˆi = `i1(θˆ1) − `i2(θˆ2) for each i and
then simply regress dˆi on unit constant to test if the estimated coefficient is significantly
different from zero.
We present the model selection testing results in table 2.3 and find out that the coeffi-
cient is positive and significant. Thus, the H0 is rejected and we conclude that a mixture
Gamma density fits the data significantly better than a mixture normal density.
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Table 2.3: Model Selection Test Statistics
Variable Coefficient T-Statistics P-Value
Constant 0.11 241.96 0
The gamma mixture model estimation result suggests 1−p = 0.0778 and p2 = 0.078∗
1,090,898
1189718
= 0.0715. Thus, about 7.15% of housing units belong to type (ii) whose electricity
consumption is extremely small compared with that of “non-vacant houses”. This, plus
(p0 = 8.27%) gives us an estimated vacancy rate p0 + p2 = 0.0827 + 0.0715 = 15.35%
for the city, which is close to the 2013 SWUFE survey of 19% vacancy rate for this city.
Next, we do the same analysis as above but considering the location of apartments. We
consider three cases: (a): inner circle houses: an apartment is close to the center of the
city (b) middle circle houses (c) out circle houses.
The location (distance to city center) variable is missing for 451,946 data points (close
to 40% sample with x > 0). For the remaining data with location variable, we split the
sample into the above three cases according to their locations. The estimation results are
given in Table 2.3. From Table 2.3 we observe that the vacancy rates (conditional on
x > 0) varies with location. For apartments located at the inner circle, it has the lowest
vacancy rate of 9.36%, followed by 15% for apartments located at the out circle. For
apartments in the middle circle, it has a relatively large vacancy rate of 16.8%. This result
is reasonable and can be explained as follows. First, for apartments close to the city center,
their values as well as rents are much higher than apartments outside this inner circle. It
is too costly to let these high value, high demand apartments to be vacant. For multiple
apartments families, if they do not live at an apartment located at the inner circle, it is more
likely for them to rent out the apartment, resulting in a low vacancy rate. For the middle
circle apartments, they have high investment values and at the same time, they are not as
expensive as apartments located at the inner circle. Therefore, many people would like to
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own apartments located in the middle circle as investments. Also, the rent as well as rental
demand in this circle is not as high as those in the inner circle, making it less attractive
for owners to rent them. This results in a high vacancy rate for apartments located at the
middle circle. Finally, for apartments located in the out circle, given their long distance
to city center and that many accompany facilities (such as shopping centers, schools, etc.)
are not well established yet, their investment values is much lower than apartments in the
middle circle. This makes people less likely to purchase multiple apartments in the out
circle as investments, leading to its lower vacancy rate than that for the middle circle.
Table 2.4: Parameter Estimation V.S Location
location sample size p 1− p α1 β1 α2 β2
inner circle 174,030 0.944 0.056 2.309 673.6 0.858 111.7
middle circle 156,672 0.9313 0.0687 1.8731 843.8 0.9207 97.67
out circle 411,796 0.9235 0.0765 2.5628 579 0.7 122
Table 2.5: Occupancy/Vacancy Rate V.S location
location Size of Zeros p0 p2 VR
close distance 6,932 0.0398 0.0538 0.0936
middle distance 16,683 0.1065 0.0614 0.1679
far distance 32,176 0.0794 0.07 0.1494
The histograms and estimated mixture Gamma densities for inner circle, middle circle
and out circle are given in figures 2.10 to 2.12.
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Figure 2.10: Histogram for Inner Circle
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Figure 2.11: Gamma Mixture Density for Inner Circle
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Figure 2.12: Histogram for Middle Circle
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3. RETAILER STRATEGIC PRICING UNDER STICKY DEMAND
With recent advancement in the availability of transactional data and the computing
power to process these data, retailers become increasingly sophisticated in setting prices
to match the supply and demand. Hence, dynamic pricing, whereby retailers adjust prices
according to demand and supply information to boost revenue and profit, becomes an
active research area in recent years [25, 26, 27, 28]. One of the foundational assumptions
in dynamic pricing is that consumers respond to price changes instantaneously. However,
as consumers we may not always respond to small price changes. For example, we may
not buy more potato chips simply because its price is reduced by a few pennies. This,
at the aggregated level, may result in demand stickiness; that is, demand may not shift,
as researchers of dynamic pricing would have assumed, to small price changes. This is
consistent with the notion of rational inattention [29, 30]. Inspired by prior theoretical
work, we aim to empirically identify and estimate the magnitude of demand stickiness
using longitudinal data from a grocery chain, with implications for dynamic pricing.
While macroeconomists have found that the market does not immediately respond to
market shocks such as new monetary policies, psychologists and marketing researchers
have similarly found that consumers do not change their consumption or saving plans
after experiencing small income shocks. In a retail environment the existence of these
rationally inattentive consumers implies delays or lack of actions to small price changes
by these consumers. That is, there exists demand stickiness due to consumer’s rational
inattention. At the same time, the notion of rational inattention also implies that consumers
will re-optimize when facing big price changes.
Clearly, these provide opportunities for retailers to exploit inattentive consumers. To
be specific, it is beneficial for a retailer to raise prices in small increments so consumers
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will not reduce their purchasing quantities. Conversely, a retailer is more likely to decrease
prices in larger increments so that consumers do increase their purchasing quantities. In
other words, if we observe the pricing behaviors of a retailer that exploits inattentive con-
sumers, we should see many more small price increases than decreases. Indeed, [31]
documented such an asymmetric price changing pattern using eight years’ of weekly Do-
minick’s data 1 by comparing the number of small price increases and decreases. However,
to make [31]’s results meaningful and useful to operations management researchers and
practitioners, one needs to estimate the magnitude of the consumer inattentive range, i.e.,
the price range within which consumers do not re-optimize their purchase quantities. This
is the focus of the current paper.
In this paper, using the same data as [31], we estimate the magnitude of this consumer
inattentive range econometrically using a structural model. We assume that the retailer’s
behaviors are optimal given consumer inattention, and we estimate the consumer inat-
tentive range from the retailer’s best response function. To check the robustness of our
results, we also directly estimate the consumer inattentive range based on the observed
sales quantities when prices change. Both models generate comparable results.2
In addition, to explore the underlying determinants of sticky demand, we investigate
the relationship of the magnitude of demand stickiness with product and consumer char-
acteristics. We find that the consumer inattentive range is positively correlated with the
proportion of hurried shoppers, and negatively correlated with the average household size
and consumer education level. Besides, consumer inattentive range is similar between pri-
vate label and national brand products and is independent of the intensity of competition.
Finally, we conduct a counterfactual analysis to show that a retailer can increase its rev-
enue by about 1% if it considers demand stickiness when setting its prices dynamically to
1Dominick’s was a grocery chain in the greater Chicago area. The data span from 1989 to 1997.
2Throughout the paper, we use “consumer inattentive range” and “magnitude of demand stickiness”
interchangeably.
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clear inventory. These results help illustrate the managerial relevance of studying demand
stickiness.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is among the first to empirically estimate
the magnitude of demand stickiness in a grocery retail environment. Our findings have
important theoretical and practical implications regarding how to better leverage dynamic
pricing for higher profits. This paper also contributes to the growing literature concerning
the effect of rational inattention on consumption behaviors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 3.1, we review pertinent liter-
ature. In section 3.2, we describe the theoretical model that derives the retailer’s optimal
price with inattentive consumers. In section 3.3, we propose econometric models and
estimate the rational inattentive range as well as the relationships of this range with prod-
uct characteristics and consumer demographics. We report the simulation results of the
counterfactual analysis in section 3.4.
3.1 Literature Review
Retailer’s strategic pricing behavior under sticky demand is related to dynamic pricing,
retail pricing and psychological/economic theories for rational inattention. We elaborate
on the most relevant research in each area below.
The literature on dynamic pricing has evolved from a focus on single product, monop-
olist, and perfect information settings to those that include multi-products, competition,
and limited demand information [32, 28]. Despite the progress made in this literature with
less restrictive assumptions and more realism, very few papers have studied behavioral
effects on dynamic pricing [33]. [34] study the effect of reference price on purchase de-
cisions, and develop a model based on the notion that consumers have memory and their
decisions could be affected by cognitive limitations. [35] embeds consumer inertia into
a decision model to reflect the phenomenon that consumers may postpone their purchase
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decisions even if it is the optimal timing to purchase. He finds the dual effects of inertia
on firm profit such that the inertia can decrease demand at beginning and increase desires
to purchase later. [36] consider the effects of consumers regret when they make purchase
decisions. Regret can induce consumers to buy either later (yielding inertia) or earlier than
the optimal purchase timing. [37] study how regret and availability misperceptions moti-
vate consumer purchase decisions, and argue that ignoring these effects could significantly
hurt firm operations and profit. Dynamic pricing has been applied to many other settings,
such as inventory problems [25], strategic consumer problems [38, 39, 26, 27], and the
retail industry [40], among others.
In the area of retail pricing, [41] builds a structural model to investigate firm’s cost
of price adjustment mechanism and to estimate the magnitude of adjustment cost using
weekly retail pricing data from a grocery chain. Another stream of works has focused on
the effect of timing, such as holidays and weekends, on retail pricing patterns [42, 43, 44].
The determinants of retail pricing decisions has been studied as well. For example, [45]
use a simultaneous equation model to study the factors that affect retailer pricing decisions.
In similar spirits, [46] uses time-series data to study the effects of price history, wholesale
prices and demand on retail prices.
While research on dynamic pricing offers the insight that consumers face cognitive
limitations and their limited cognition could affect retail pricing, there is little empirical
work in this area. Research on retail pricing, though largely empirical, has not studied the
behavioral effects of consumer’s cognitive limitations on pricing [47]. Our paper fills this
gap in the literature by assuming that consumers are rationally inattentive and cannot fully
respond to a small price change, and we estimate the ensuing demand stickiness due to
consumer’s rational inattention. This assumption is supported by research in economics
and marketing on rational inattention [48, 29, 30].
Most relevant to our current work, two models of rational inattention have been pro-
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posed. In one model, [30] borrows Shannon’s information theory and models a utility-
maximizing agent as an information processing channel. Due to channel capacity con-
straints, the agent chooses not to pay attention to all of the information. As a result, as
Sims observes, “[a]gents with rational inattention ... will respond with more delay and
information-processing error – or may not respond at all – to fluctuations that are small
and therefore relatively unimportant to them.” [29] proposes an alternative model in which
the costs of monitoring, absorbing and processing information force utility-maximizing
agents to update their choice of actions only sporadically. Therefore, “[t]hese consumers
rationally choose to only sporadically update their information and re-compute their opti-
mal consumption plans. In between updating dates, they remain inattentive.” Regardless
of which model one adopts, in a retail environment the existence of inattentive consumers
implies delays or lack of actions to a small price changes on the consumers’ side. That
is, there exists demand stickiness among inattentive consumers. On the other hand, both
models predict that consumers will be attentive to big price changes.
3.2 The Model
In this section, we model the retailer’s profit maximization process. Assume there
exists menu cost and it is a fixed cost [49, 50]. The menu cost is incurred when the
retailer decides to change the price; that is, when the current period’s price is different
from last period’s. The retailer maximizes its profit by choosing a retail price in each time
period. Assume that the demand function and the cost of the products are exogenous. The
decisions for the retailer to make are: 1. Whether or not to pay the menu cost to change
the price; and 2. if the menu cost is paid, what is the new optimal price to set? The first
question is answered through backward induction. If the new optimal price in the second
stage yields an excess profit (i.e., relative to the profit generated by the old price) that
is greater than the menu cost, the retailer chooses to pay the menu cost. Otherwise, the
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retailer chooses not to change the price. Note that the menu cost becomes sunk in the
second stage. In the following, we focus on the second stage, which involves the modeling
of the demand function structure.
3.2.1 The General Framework
For analytical trackability, we assume that for a given product, its demand function
is determined only by its own historical and present prices3 but not by other products’
prices or its own future prices. Thus, we write D(pt) as the demand function of a given
product, where pt is the price of this product at time t. Note that this demand function
takes only current period’s price as the argument. It does not account for any reference
effect. We call this the simple demand function, whereby every consumer re-optimizes her
purchasing behavior according to the latest price. Following [29] and [30], we incorporate
consumer’s rational inattention by assuming that only some of the consumers will re-
optimize in response to the latest price. Denote the fraction of consumers whose last re-
optimization happens at time t as wt. Denote D˜(pt, pt−1, · · · , p1) as the effective demand
given by
D˜(pt, pt−1, · · · , p1) = wtD(pt) + wt−1D(pt−1) + · · ·+ w1D(p1) (3.1)
The effective demand function is a weighted sum of all simple demand functions from time
1 to time t. For analytical trackability, we simplify the effective demand function by doing
the following approximation. Since each consumer re-optimizes sporadically, for those
time periods far away from time t, the fraction wt should be close to zero. This enables
us to ignore those time periods before t − 1 without causing significant imprecision. The
3In other words, we assume consumers are myopic. Incorporating forward-looking into our model should
not change our results qualitatively.
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simplified version of the effective demand function is given by
D˜(pt, pt−1) = wtD(pt) + wt−1D(pt−1) (3.2)
Since wt and wt−1 should cover all of the consumers, we have wt−1 = 1− wt. The above
equation can be further rewritten as
D˜(pt, pt−1) = wtD(pt) + (1− wt)D(pt−1) (3.3)
After specifying the effective demand function, we bring in cost to construct the profit.
The cost is assumed to be exogenous and denoted as ct. Denote pi(pt|pt−1) as the profit a
retailer can make at time t, which is given by
pi(pt|pt−1) = D˜(pt, pt−1)× (pt − ct) (3.4)
The profit is conditional on the last period’s price because the effective demand function
takes last period’s price as an argument. The retailer chooses the retail price pt to maximize
its profit pi(pt|pt−1). Now we have a general idea of the profit maximization process. In
the next section, we will discuss the detail of the simple demand function and the fraction
of consumers who re-optimizes at time t, to derive an analytical solution for the retailer’s
profit maximization problem.
3.2.2 The Analytical Solution
To obtain the analytical solution to the retailer’s profit maximization problem, we first
make more assumptions about the simple demand function. Assume that the simple de-
mand function is linear in retail price, i.e., D(pt) = β0 + β1pt, where β0 > 0, β1 < 0 and
pt ≤ −β0/β1. To avoid unnecessary complexity, we assume that the cost ct is low enough
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for the retailer to a make positive profit, i.e., D(ct) > 0 for all t. The next question is
how to determine the fraction of consumers who re-optimizes at time t. We model the re-
optimizing process by introducing a re-optimizing threshold, denoted as L. The threshold
is comparable to the price change. A consumer decides to re-optimize if the price change
is greater than the threshold; otherwise not. We allow for heterogeneity among consumers.
The re-optimizing threshold is thus individual-specific, denoted as Lk, where k is the index
for consumers, from 1 to n. The price change is defined as ∆pt = |pt − pt−1|. Assume Lk
is a random variable. For all k = 1, 2, · · · , n, Lk is i.i.d. and follows distribution F . Given
the setup of consumer’s re-optimization process, we are able to obtain the probability of
re-optimizing for each specific consumer k, which is P (Lk < ∆pt) = F (∆pt). Further-
more, the expected fraction of consumers who re-optimizes at time t can be expressed in
terms of the above probability.
We then plug the above equation into the effective demand function and profit function.
ED˜(pt, pt−1) = F (∆pt)D(pt) + (1− F (∆pt))D(pt−1) (3.5)
pi(pt|pt−1) = (pt − ct)(F (∆pt)D(pt) + (1− F (∆pt))D(pt−1)) (3.6)
We see that the last unspecified component in the profit function is the distribution F .
Since F is the distribution for consumer’s re-optimizing threshold, it should satisfy that
F (0) = 0 (no negative threshold) and we also assume that F has a lower bound and an
upper bound. A good candidate for F is uniform distribution. We will deploy uniform
distribution in the following, i.e., F ∼ Uniform(0, U), where U > 0.
Now we are ready to derive the analytical solution for the retailer’s profit maximization
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problem. We first write down the problem as
max
pt
(pt − ct)(F (∆pt)D(pt) + (1− F (∆pt))D(pt−1)) (3.7)
Note that F (∆pt) is not differentiable at pt−1, pt−1 − U and pt−1 + U . The first-order
condition for Equation (3.7) is given by
0 = F (∆pt)D(pt) + (1− F (∆pt))D(pt−1)+
(pt − ct)(dF (∆pt)
dpt
D(pt) + F (∆pt)
dD(pt)
dpt
− dF (∆pt)
dpt
D(pt−1))
(3.8)
where pt 6∈ {pt−1, pt−1 − U, pt−1 + U}. The following proposition states the analytical
solution. To simplify the notation, denote A ≡ −β1γ(pt−1 − ct), B ≡ 3β1γ(β0 + β1pt−1)
and γ ≡ 1/U .
Proposition
The profit maximizer p∗t for Equation (3.7) is contained in the set of
{pt−1 + A−
√
A2 −B
3β1γ
, pt−1 − −A−
√
A2 +B
3β1γ
,
ct − β0/β1
2
, pt−1 − 1/γ, pt−1 + 1/γ},
denoted as {p1t , p2t , p3t , pt−1 − 1/γ, pt−1 + 1/γ}.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
By the above proposition, we know that Equation (3.7) has at most 5 profit maximizers.
In the case when there are multiple profit maximizers (even though it is very unlikely), we
assume the retailer chooses the smallest maximizer. By this assumption, we can construct
a single-valued optimal pricing function p∗t = g(pt−1, ct; β0, β1, U). This optimal pricing
function takes previous price and current cost as arguments and contains the parameters of
the demand function and the distribution of consumer re-optimizing threshold.
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3.2.3 An Example
To illustrate how our model works, we plug a set of parameters into the model to
generate a simple example. For the simple demand function, we set β0 = 10 and β1 = −2,
i.e., D(pt) = 10 − 2pt. The cost for the current period t is 1, i.e., ct = 1. If there is
no demand stickiness, it is easy to see that the optimal price is 3, i.e., p∗t = 3 maximizes
D(pt)× (pt− ct). The maximized profit is 8. Now we consider how sticky demand affects
retailer’s optimal price and profit. We examine four cases where U = 0.2, 0.15, 0.1 and
0.05, respectively. The last period’s price pt−1 takes values between 2.4 and 3.4. Figure 3.1
illustrates the response of p∗t when pt−1 changes while other parameters remain the same.
The x-axis is pt−1 and the y-axis is p∗t . The solid line is a 45 degree line representing
p∗t = pt−1, and the bubble line shows the value of p
∗
t . We see that if pt−1 is far away from
3, the retailer will directly choose 3 as the optimal price. In such cases, p∗t is far away
from pt−1, i.e., ∆pt > U , and there is no effect of demand stickiness. If pt−1 is close to
3, the retailer is able to leverage demand stickiness for a bigger profit. To be specific, the
retailer tends to set a price that is a little bit higher than pt−1. This results are consistent
with [31]’s findings. The reason behind these results is that, with sticky demand, raising
the price by a small amount leads to only a negligible loss of sales. Figure 3.2 shows
how much more profit we can make with demand stickiness. We see that all four curves
are above 8, which is the optimal profit that we can make without demand stickiness. If
we compare the amount of the excess profit (relative to 8), we see that the higher the
re-optimizing threshold is, the more excess profit the retailer makes.
3.3 Empirical Studies
In this section, we estimate the parameters in the theoretical model by using retail
transactional data. The parameter of interest is the re-optimizing threshold distribution F ,
from which we learn how consumers react to price changes, or how sticky the demand is.
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Figure 3.1: Effects of U on p∗t
The data we use is Dominick’s scanner data4, which we briefly describe below.
3.3.1 Data Description
Dominick’s was a large grocery chain in the greater Chicago area. The data set covers
400 weeks from 1989 to 1997, and the chain had about 100 stores. The data set con-
tains weekly transactional data in each store for each product (identified by UPC) in 29
categories. A transaction data point includes the quantity of a certain product being sold
during that specific week and the price at which the product is sold. We backtrack the
average cost of each product in each week and each store using the price and profit data.
4See [51] for details about DominickâA˘Z´s data, which can be downloaded from
http://research.chicagobooth.edu/marketing/databases/dominicks/index.aspx.
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Figure 3.2: Effects of U on pi∗
For each store, we can also observe demographics of the district in which the store is lo-
cated. The demographics data includes basic social economics variables such as education
and income, as well as some specific characteristics of shoppers such as the proportion of
hurried shoppers5.
Before we empirically estimate the model, we adjust the prices for inflation6. We ex-
clude data from those weeks that fall into the holiday seasons (e.g., Thanksgiving, Christ-
mas, New Year), as research has shown that Donimick’s pricing behaviors are different
during holidays [42]. We also exclude sales prices using Dominick’s sales indicators7.
5The proportion of hurried shopper refers to the percentage of consumers that go through the express
lane in each store.
6We obtain the CPI for the Chicago area from http://www.bls.gov.
7DominickâA˘Z´s sales dummy is an imperfect measure of actual sales in that some sales are not recorded
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With sale prices, retailers leverage all kinds of marketing tactics (e.g., store signage, color
changes) to ensure that consumers react to the price reductions [53]. That is, with sale
prices consumers will almost always re-optimize. Therefore, we use regular prices only
to obtain a clean estimate of the re-optimizing threshold. In addition, changes in regu-
lar prices do not have predictable patterns, as factors that influence regular price changes
(e.g., changes in wholesale prices, act of God) are less observable by consumers. Thus,
the focus on regular prices is consistent with the assumption of myopic consumers in our
theoretical model.
3.3.2 Estimation Method
In this section, we discuss the method for estimating the parameters in the theoretical
model. From the data description, we know that the data structure is of a panel structure.
We have multiple products, indexed as i = 1, · · · , N , and multiple time periods, indexed
as t = 1, · · · , T . The observables are sales (qi,t), price (pi,t) and cost (ci,t).
3.3.2.1 Estimation of the Simple Demand Functions
First, we estimate the parameters in the simple demand functions. Note that for dif-
ferent products, their simple demand functions are not necessarily identical. Thus, the
demand function estimation is product-specific. The parameters to be estimated are β0
and β1 for each product i, which are denoted as βi,0 and βi,1 respectively for exposition
purposes. From Equation (3.5), we have that
ED˜(pi,t, pi,t−1) = F (∆pi,t)D(pi,t) + (1− F (∆pi,t))D(pi,t−1)
which are β0 and β1 for product i. Note that the unknown value of the function F will lead
to non-identification of βi,0 and βi,1. To get rid of this problem, we use sub-sample where
[52]. Therefore, our estimation of demand stickiness is a conservative one.
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pi,t = pi,t−1. When pi,t = pi,t−1, we have that ∆pi,t = 0 and F (∆pi,t) = 0. The equation
above reduces to
ED˜(pi,t, pi,t−1) = D(pi,t−1) = D(pi,t)
We assume E(qi,t) = ED˜(pi,t, pi,t−1) = D(pi,t). By adding a structural error term ui,t, we
write the econometrics model as
qi,t = D(pi,t) + ui,t = βi,0 + βi,1pi,t + ui,t (3.9)
where ui,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2i,u). For each product i, we are now able to estimate βi,0 and βi,1.
The estimation results in a set of {βi,0}Ni=1 and a set of {βi,1}Ni=1, where N is the number
of products.
3.3.2.2 Estimation of Re-Optimizing Thresholds
As described in Section 3.2, the re-optimizing threshold only plays a role in the second
stage of the retailer’s decision process. To identify the re-optimizing threshold, we focus
on the cases in which the retailer enters into the second stage, i.e., the retailer chooses to
change the price. Thus, we use another sub-sample where pi,t 6= pi,t−1 for the estimation.
Recall that the re-optimizing threshold Lk is a random variable, where k is the index
for consumers. A good way to present Lk is to report its mean, denoted as L¯. For each
product i, we expect a product-specific L¯i. However, reporting product-specific L¯i for all
products will be too cumbersome, without providing much insights. Our main interest is
the re-optimizing threshold at the category level and store level. To pool across products i
on category level and store level, we introduce relative re-optimizing threshold, denoted as
L¯R, assuming that the relative re-optimizing threshold is identical across products within
the same category and same store. The relative re-optimizing threshold is the threshold
adjusted by the specific product’s average price, i.e., L¯R = L¯ip¯i , where p¯i is the average
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price. The average price is obtained by p¯i = 1T
∑T
t=1 pi,t. Henceforth, the product index i
is within a certain category and a certain store, and the estimation of L¯R is conditional on
category and store. From Section 3.2, we know that the theoretical optimal price is given
by
p∗i,t = g(pi,t−1, ci,t; βi,0, βi,1, Ui)
Recall that Lk is assumed to be uniformly distributed and Ui is the upper bound. We
immediately have L¯i = Ui2 and L¯R =
Ui
2p¯i
. We express the above equation in terms of the
relative re-optimizing threshold.
p∗i,t = g(pi,t−1, ci,t; βi,0, βi,1, 2p¯iL¯R)
We assume that E(pi,t) = p∗i,t. By adding a structural error term i,t, we write the econo-
metrics model.
pi,t = p
∗
i,t + i,t = g(pi,t−1, ci,t; βi,0, βi,1, 2p¯iL¯R) + i,t
where i,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2 ). Plug in the estimates of βi,0 and βi,1 from the previous section,
we have
pi,t = g(pi,t−1, ci,t; βˆi,0, βˆi,1, 2p¯iL¯R) + i,t (3.10)
Note that the only unknown parameter is L¯R. Since the function g is nonlinear in L¯R, we
use the method of nonlinear least squares to estimate L¯R.
To check the robustness of our results, we alternatively estimate the re-optimizing
threshold as it is directly revealed in consumer’s purchase behavior. From Section 3.2, we
have that
ED˜(pi,t, pi,t−1) = F (∆pi,t)D(pi,t) + (1− F (∆pi,t))D(pi,t−1)
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Writing the above equation in terms of parameters, we have
ED˜(pi,t, pi,t−1) = βi,0 + βi,1(F (∆pi,t;Ui)pi,t + (1− F (∆pi,t;Ui)pi,t−1)
Plugging in the relationship between Ui and L¯R, we have
ED˜(pi,t, pi,t−1) = βi,0 + βi,1(F (∆pi,t; 2p¯iL¯R)pi,t + (1− F (∆pi,t; 2p¯iL¯R)pi,t−1)
Assuming E(qi,t) = ED˜(pi,t, pi,t−1) and adding a structural error term vi,t, we write the
econometrics model as
qi,t = βi,0 + βi,1(F (∆pi,t; 2p¯iL¯R)pi,t + (1− F (∆pi,t; 2p¯iL¯R)pi,t−1) + vi,t
where vi,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2i,v). Plugging in the estimates of βi,0 and βi,1, we have
qi,t = βˆi,0 + βˆi,1(F (∆pi,t; 2p¯iL¯R)pi,t + (1− F (∆pi,t; 2p¯iL¯R)pi,t−1) + vi,t (3.11)
Note that the only unknown parameter is L¯R. Since the function F is nonlinear in L¯R, we
use the method of nonlinear least squares to estimate γ.
3.3.3 Results
Recall that each relative re-optimizing threshold L¯R is estimated for a certain category
and a certain store. The first way to report these estimates is by summarizing the thresh-
olds across stores, i.e., to report distributional characteristics (mean and standard devia-
tion). Table 3.1 reports the estimation results for 12 categories. These categories consist
of six that represent relatively less consumable products and six that represent relatively
more consumable products. We expect that the products that are less consumable can be
stockpiled, and that consumers who bought these products at regular prices are those that
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face higher re-optimization costs. Therefore, comparing the re-optimizing threshold be-
tween the two groups (with six categories each) allows us to validate our logic for demand
stickiness that is due to consumer re-optimizing cost. Specifically, we expect that the re-
optimizing threshold should on average be bigger for the more consumable than the less
consumable products. As each category contains a large number of stores, we summarize
the results as mean and stand deviation across stores. The first two columns in Table 3.1
are the results from the main analysis and the last two columns are those from the alterna-
tive estimation approach. The two approaches give similar results, providing evidence for
the robustness of our structural model.
On average, the relative re-optimizing threshold ranges between 0.01 and 0.29. The
majority, i.e., 19/24 or 79%, of the relative re-optimizing thresholds are at or above 0.05.
As expected, the threshold is indeed bigger for the six less consumable categories than the
six more consumable categories, confirming our logic based on consumer re-optimizing
cost.
Table 3.1: Estimation Results for 12 Categories
Main Alternative
Mean Std Mean Std
Bath Soap 0.18 0.13 0.19 0.38
Dish Detergent 0.15 0.08 0.05 0.22
Grooming Products 0.17 0.06 0.10 0.11
Shampoos 0.18 0.07 0.16 0.08
Soap 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.10
Toothbrushes 0.29 0.16 0.10 0.11
Cookies 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.04
Crackers 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08
Canned Soup 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.01
Front-End-Candies 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05
Soft Drinks 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02
Snack Crackers 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.06
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Table 3.2 shows the relationship between relative re-optimizing threshold and demo-
graphics. The demographic variables we pick here are % of college graduates and above
(educ), income (income), % of whites (ethnic), average household size (hsizeavg), popula-
tion density (density), % of hurried shopper (shphurr), and % of non-working women with
children (nwrkch). We include these variables in our analysis with the expectation that they
are correlated with the consumer’s re-optimizing cost. We estimate their effects with a lin-
ear regression with category fixed effects. We log-transform the threshold as our dependent
variable, to capture the scaling (vs. shifting) effects of consumer demographics. We see
that the threshold is positively correlated with the proportion of hurried shopper, and neg-
atively correlated with the average household size and the proportion of college graduates
and above. These results are intuitively appealing and further validate our logic based on
consumer’s re-optimizing cost. Specifically, hurried shoppers do not have enough time to
remember or compare a price, which leads to a high level of re-optimizing cost, resulting
in a higher threshold. For people in a large household with relative tight budge, a small
price change in grocery items can be more consequential. Therefore, these consumers ex-
perience higher re-optimizing benefits, resulting in a lower threshold. Finally, people with
more education should have more cognitive resources to process price information than
the rest of the population. Those consumers experience lower cost of remembering and
comparing prices, leading to lower re-optimizing threshold.
We also estimate the effects of store and product characteristics on the re-optimizing
threshold. Dominick’s groups its stores into four tiers: Cub Fighters, Low, Medium, High.
We estimate the threshold for each tier. Table 3.3 shows the effects of price tiers on the
threshold. We also report the average income for each price tier. The average income is the
highest in the Cub Fighter tier, while the tier with the second highest income is medium
followed by low and high.8 We see that in the case of Cub Fighters, the threshold is the
8This hints at the possibility that Dominick’s was likely to open a store next to a Cub Foods to fight for
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Table 3.2: Regression on Demographics
log(L¯R)
educ -2.881
(-1.89)*
income -0.000
(-0.02)
ethnic 0.968
(1.54)
hsizeavg -2.098**
(-2.54)
density -17.23
(-0.18)
shphurr 12.80**
(2.17)
nwrkch -0.474
(-0.16)
N 995
smallest even though the income is the highest, testifying to the power of competition on
reducing the re-optimizing costs. The threshold for the Low price tier is similarly low,
which is not surprising given that this tier has the lowest income.
Finally, Table 3.4 shows the re-optimizing threshold comparing national brands and
private labels. We follow [42] and [54] and use pairs of national brands and private labels
that match on sizes and quality. We see that there is no significant difference between
national brands and private labels.
3.4 Simulation
In this section, we present an application of demand stickiness in a dynamic pricing
setting. Traditional studies of dynamic pricing assume that consumers will respond to
any price change, no matter how small it is. If we relax this assumption by introducing
sticky demand, the traditional dynamic pricing strategy may no longer be the optimal
high income consumers and confirms the speculation that retailers may take the advantage of constraints
faced by low income consumers in terms of storage, transportation, and cognitive resources.
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Table 3.3: Effects of Price Tiers
L¯ Income (×1000)
Cub Fighter 0.111 46.13
Low 0.123 42.04
Med 0.120 44.01
High 0.112 38.74
Table 3.4: National Brand versus Private Label
National Brand Private Label
Bottled Juice 0.13 0.11
Cereals 0.15 0.05
Cheese 0.11 0.11
Cookies 0.09 0.11
Crackers 0.09 0.15
Canned Soup 0.09 0.14
Dish Detergent 0.13 0.10
Frozen Entrees 0.12 0.10
Frozen Juices 0.18 0.15
Fabric Softener 0.11 0.08
Grooming Products 0.10 0.21
Laundry Detergents 0.20 0.13
Oatmeal 0.11 0.11
Snack Crackers 0.06 0.08
Canned Tuna 0.10 0.11
pricing strategy. Therefore, we propose a new dynamic pricing strategy to accommodate
sticky demand. Several simulation cases are set up to examine the performance (in terms
of distributional characteristics of revenue) of both traditional and new dynamic pricing
strategies. In addition, we also consider the performance of fixed pricing as a bench mark.
3.4.1 Simulation Setup
Suppose there are 100 units of a perishable good in the inventory. A retailer has T
weeks to sell them. After T weeks, the salvage value is 0. T takes three values: 10,
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15 and 20. The expected effective demand is defined in the same way as in Section 3.2,
i.e., ED˜(pt, pt−1) = F (∆pt)D(pt) + (1 − F (∆pt))D(pt−1). Assume that the effective
demand follows a Poisson distribution with mean as ED˜(pt, pt−1), i.e., D˜t(pt, pt−1) ∼
Poisson(ED˜(pt, pt−1)). For the parameters in the simple demand function, we use the
estimates from the previous section. Since every product in every store has a unique simple
demand function, we randomly pick a product in the category of crackers and a store. Set
β0 = 16.67 and β1 = −4.63, i.e., D(pt) = 16.67 − 4.63pt. The mean re-optimizing
threshold L¯R takes three values: 0.1, 0.25 and 0.4. Assume that the discount factor is 1.
For fixed pricing, there is only one parameter to be determined, which is the fixed price
p. The revenue maximization problem is given by
max
p
T∑
t=1
p× (Pr(It)E(D˜t(p, p)|It) + (1− Pr(It))E(max{100−
t−1∑
s=1
D˜s(p, p)), 0}) (3.12)
where condition It is
∑t
s=1 D˜s(p, p) ≤ 100. It means that the realization of demand in
each period cannot exceed the remaining inventory. If there are too many customers ar-
riving, the product will be out of stock, in which case we set the demand as the remaining
inventory available. The optimal price for fixed pricing is numerically solved with preci-
sion of one decimal.
We use dynamic programming to solve for the optimal prices in the cases when dy-
namic pricing strategy is adopted. Denote V At,Gt(pt) as the value function for the case with
a re-optimizing threshold of zero, where t is the current time period, Gt is the remaining
inventory at time t and pt is the price to be set in this time period. The state variables are
t and Gt, and the control variable is pt. Denote V It,Gt,pt−1(pt) as the value function for the
case with a non-zero re-optimizing threshold, where t is the current time period, Gt is the
remaining inventory at time t, pt−1 is the last period’s price and pt is the price to be set
in this time period. The state variables are t, Gt and pt−1, and the control variable is pt.
When t = 1, we set p0 = ∞, so there is no sticky demand effect in the first time period.
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We adopt the algorithm of backward induction. The Bellman equation for the case with a
non-sticky demand is given by
V At,Gt = maxpt
E(ptD˜t(pt, pt) + V
A
t+1,Gt+1
|D˜t(pt, pt) ≤ Gt) (3.13)
After T weeks, the good has no value, i.e.
V AT+1,GT+1 = 0, ∀GT+1 (3.14)
Note that the effective demand function D˜t(pt, pt) does not depend on last period’s price
under the assumption that demand is non-sticky. On the other hand, the Bellman equation
for the case with a sticky demand is given by
V It,Gt,pt−1 = maxpt
E(ptD˜t(pt, pt−1) + V It+1,Gt+1,pt |D˜t(pt, pt−1) ≤ Gt) (3.15)
After T weeks, the good has no value, i.e.,
V IT+1,GT+1,pT = 0, ∀GT+1, pT (3.16)
These dynamic programming problems are solved numerically. The optimal price has a
precision of one decimal.
3.4.2 Simulation Results
Tables 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 report the revenues generated from 1,000 simulations with
T = 10, 15 and 20. The revenues are summarized in mean (over the bracket), standard
deviation (in round bracket) and frequency of generating the highest revenue (in square
bracket). The mean of the revenues is a simple measure of a pricing strategy’s perfor-
mance. Under risk-aversion, the standard deviation also play an important role in de-
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termining the performance. The frequency of generating the highest revenue is a direct
indicator of the best pricing strategy. In each case, we report the results from the three
pricing strategies: fixed pricing, dynamic pricing with non-sticky demand, and dynamic
pricing with sticky demand, and from three values of re-optimizing threshold: L¯ = 0.1,
0.25 and 0.4.
When T = 10, dynamic pricing with sticky demand has the highest mean and fre-
quency of generating the highest revenue, while fixed pricing has the lowest standard er-
rors. Fixed pricing and dynamic pricing with non-sticky demand perform similarly on all
three aspects. As the time horizon T becomes longer, for all pricing strategies, the means
increase and standard deviations decrease, i.e., all of the pricing strategies perform better.
The advantage of dynamic pricing against fixed pricing becomes larger as T increases. If
we look at the variation of the re-optimizing threshold L¯, the advantage of dynamic pricing
with sticky demand against dynamic pricing with non-sticky demand becomes larger as L¯
increases.
Table 3.5: Simulated Revenues with T = 10
L¯ = 0.1 L¯ = 0.25 L¯ = 0.4
Fixed 149.56 149.82 149.63
(16.00) (15.69) (15.61)
[0.30] [0.28] [0.25]
Dynamic non-sticky 150.30 149.82 149.58
(16.24) (16.38) (16.47)
[0.31] [0.28] [0.27]
Dynamic sticky 152.61 155.46 157.55
(16.46) (16.60) (16.90)
[0.38] [0.43] [0.48]
Figure 3.3 shows the price trajectory in one single simulation with T = 20 and L¯ =
0.25. The fixed pricing sets p = 2.5 as the optimal price. Compared to the fixed pricing,
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Table 3.6: Simulated Revenues with T = 15
L¯ = 0.1 L¯ = 0.25 L¯ = 0.4
Fixed 208.07 208.04 208.37
(14.29) (14.32) (14.44)
[0.24] [0.20] [0.19]
Dynamic non-sticky 210.76 210.31 210.77
(14.75) (15.34) (15.25)
[0.33] [0.29] [0.28]
Dynamic sticky 213.83 216.84 218.51
(14.02) (14.40) (14.03)
[0.43] [0.50] [0.53]
Table 3.7: Simulated Revenues with T = 20
L¯ = 0.1 L¯ = 0.25 L¯ = 0.4
Fixed 242.11 242.44 242.15
(12.71) (12.48) (12.83)
[0.17] [0.15] [0.13]
Dynamic non-sticky 246.78 246.30 246.24
(11.70) (12.23) (12.26)
[0.34] [0.30] [0.29]
Dynamic sticky 249.56 251.88 253.12
(11.01) (11.15) (10.93)
[0.49] [0.54] [0.59]
the dynamic pricing with non-sticky demand sets higher prices in early periods and lower
prices in late periods. For dynamic pricing with sticky demand, if we smooth out the
regular cycles and focus on the long-term trend, we see a similar pattern as that shown for
traditional dynamic pricing (higher in early periods and lower in late periods). When we
examine those cycle, we see that when the price goes up, it takes two to three periods for
the price to increase, and when the price goes down, it takes only one period for the price
to decrease. That is, price increases are slow and price decreases are fast. These results are
consistent with our theoretical model implication and empirical findings in the literature
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[31, 52].
Figure 3.3: Price Trajectory
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4. NONPARAMETRIC CONDITIONAL QUANTILE FUNCTION ESTIMATION
FOR TIME SERIES DATA
Compared with a conditional mean function, a conditional quantile function can pro-
vide a comprehensive picture about the conditional distribution of a dependent variable
conditional on explanatory variables. Hence, the study of conditional quantile function
has its empirical appeals. For this reason there is a rich literature in studying estimation
of conditional quantile functions. For independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) data,
the study of conditional quantile function estimation stems from the seminal work of [55]
who study conditional quantile function in a parametric model framework. More recently,
a growing literature thrive to study the conditional quantile function in a nonparametric
framework, requested by the empirical needs of practitioners, such as [56], [57], [58],[59],
[60], [61], [62], [63], [64], and [65].
Many existing nonparametric conditional quantile estimators are indirect estimators
since they are solutions to equations that indirectly deliver a quantile. Among literature
on indirect nonparametric conditional quantile estimators, [56], [57], [58], [59], [60], and
[63] use the check function to indirectly estimate conditional a quantile function non-
parametrically. [61] indirectly estimate conditional quantile function nonparametrically
by inverting an estimated conditional CDF. In addition to indirect estimation methods in
conditional quantile estimation, [65] initiates a direct nonparametric conditional quantile
estimation method, which has two advantages over indirect methods. First, the pointwise
bias of the direct estimator contains one less term than the indirect estimator, hence the
direct estimator has smaller minmax bias risk. Second, when the explanatory variable data
support is unbounded, the variance of the direct estimator is smaller in magnitude than
the check function based counterpart in the tail regions. Hence, the direct estimator may
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offer substantial finite sample efficiency gains relative to the indirect estimator in the tail
regions.
The distributions of many financial variables are known to have fat tails. Hence, the
direct nonparametric conditional quantile estimator may outperform the indirect estimator
in tail regions. However, if one wants to apply direct nonparametric conditional quantile
estimation method to forecast some financial variables, one should establish the validity
of the direct nonparametric conditional quantile estimator for dependent data. In partic-
ular, one needs to study the asymptotic distribution of the conditional quantile estimator.
Many authors have studied the theoretical properties of nonparametric estimators for de-
pendent data by establishing Central Limit Theorems (CLT) for various type dependent
data. For example, [66] establishes CLTs for degenerate U-statistics of m-dependent pro-
cesses. [67], [68] and [69] consider degenerate U-statistics of absolutely regular processes
and other weakly dependent processes. [70] prove the asymptotic normality of the inte-
grated squared error of the kernel density estimator for absolutely regular processes. [71]
provide a general CLTs for second order degenerate U-statistics with variable kernels for
absolutely regular processes. Using Central Limit Theorems for dependent observations,
[72] study the nonparametric regression model Yt = θ(Zt) + Xt, where θ(.) is an un-
known function and {Xt} follows an autoregressive process. Under a set of high level
assumptions [73] establishes the
√
n-consistency and asymptotic normality of MINPIN
estimators, which are estimators that minimize a criterion function that may depend on
a preliminary infinite dimensional nuisance parameter estimator. [74] extends the
√
n-
consistency and asymptotic normality results of a partially linear model of [75] for inde-
pendent observations to weakly dependent processes.
In this paper we study the theoretical properties of the direct nonparametric conditional
quantile estimator proposed by [65] with weakly dependent observations. We prove the
asymptotic normality of the direct nonparametric conditional quantile estimator under ab-
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solutely regular processes. We derive the asymptotic distribution of our proposed estimator
and compare the finite sample performance of our estimator and traditional check function
estimator by Monte Carlo simulations. We show that our proposed direct method outper-
forms conventional check function based method in terms of out-of-sample predictions.
We then apply the direct nonparametric estimation method to forecast U.S. housing return
based on S&P/Case-Shiller House Price Indices and compare the forecasting results with
that of some indirect estimators. The comparison results show that the forecasting values
of housing return by direct estimation method indeed outperforms the indirect counterpart,
especially for data in the tail regions.
The paper is organized as follows: we study the asymptotic normality of the direct
nonparametric conditional quantile estimator under absolutely regular processes in Secion
2. Section 3 conducts the Monte Carlo simulations to study the finite sample performance
of our proposed direct method. In Section 4, we apply the direct estimation method to fore-
cast U.S. monthly housing returns and compare the forecast result with its check function
based counterpart. The proofs of the main results are presented in the Appendix 2.
4.1 Direct Nonparametric Conditional Quantile Estimator
We consider the following location-scale model:
Yt = a(Xt) + b(Xt) εt, t = 1, ....., n
where a(Xt) and b(Xt) ≥ 0 are unknown smooth location and scale functions, the id-
iosyncratic error εt is i.i.d with zero mean and a unit variance with an unknown distribu-
tion function Fε(·). We consider the problem of estimating the τ -th conditional quantile
function with τ ∈ [τ , τ¯ ] ≡ Λ, where 0 < τ < τ¯ < 1.
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4.1.1 The Local Constant Estimator
Following [65], we estimate the conditional τ -th quantile function of Yt given Xt eval-
uated at Xt = x by
qˆτ (x) =
1
nh
∑n
t=1QN(Yt,bˆ(Xt)),δˆK((Xt − x)/h)
fˆ(x)
, (4.1)
where QN(µ,σ),δ = µ + σQN(0,1),δ denotes the δ ∈ (0, 1) quantile of a Gaussian random
variable with mean µ and standard deviation σ, QN(0,1),δ is the δ ∈ (0, 1) quantile of
a standard Gaussian random variable, δˆ ∈ (0, 1) is an estimated parameter that is deter-
mined by the least squares cross validation data-driven method that we will describe below,
fˆ(x) = (nh)−1
∑T
t=1 K((Xt − x)/h) is the kernel estimator of the marginal density for
Xt evaluated at x, bˆ(Xt) =
√
bˆ2(Xt) is a kernel estimator of the conditional standard de-
viation of Yt, bˆ2(Xt) = Eˆ{[Yt − Eˆ(Yt|Xt)]2|Xt} is the kernel estimator of the conditional
variance of Yt given Xt. The reason that qˆτ (x) defined in 4.1 is a consistent estimator
of qτ (x) is that for any τ ∈ (0, 1), there exist a δ0 = δ0(τ) such that QN(0,1),δ0 = Q,τ ,
where Q,τ is the τ th quantile of . As in [65], one can show that if δˆ = δ0 + Op(1), then
qˆτ (x) = qτ (x) +Op(1). Indeed, we will show that δˆ = δ0(τ) +Op(1) in this paper.
This nonparametric conditional quantile local constant estimator requires two steps. In
the first step, we estimate conditional moments of Yt using a second order kernel function:
Eˆ(Y lt |Xt) = (nh1)−1
∑n
s=1 Y
l
s K˜st/f˜(Xt) for l = 1, 2, where f˜(Xt) = (nh1)
−1∑n
s=1 K˜st,
K˜st = K((Xs−Xt)/h1). This gives us kernel estimators of aˆ(Xt) and bˆ(Xt). In the second
step, we select η and h simultaneously by minimizing the following objective function:
(ηˆ, hˆ) = arg min
(η,h)∈[η,η]×Hn
1
n
n∑
t=1
ρτ (Yt − qˆτ,−t(Xt))M(Xt) (4.2)
where ρτ (.) is the check function, i.e., ρτ (z) = z[τ − 1(z ≤ 0)], η def= QN(0,1),δ ≡
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√
2erf−1(2δ− 1),1 [η, η] is the support of η, which corresponds to [τ , τ ], the support of τ .
Here, as in [65], we reparametrized the parameter from δ to η = η(δ) =
√
2erf−1(2δ− 1)
to simplify notation.
Let Hn = [c1n−1/5, c2n−1/5] be the support of h with 0 < c1 < c2 < ∞, i.e., h ∈ Hn,
let M(Xt) be a trimming function that trims out data near the boundary, and qˆτ,−t(Xt) is
the leave-one-out τ -th conditonal quantile estimator:
qˆτ,−t(Xt) =
1
nh
∑n
s 6=tQN(Ys,bˆ(Xs)),δKst
fˆ−t(Xt)
where Kst = K((Xs − Xt)/h), fˆ−t(Xt) = (nh)−1
∑T
s 6=tK((Xs − Xt)/h) is the leave-
one-out kernel estimator of f(Xt).
We use a two-step estimation procedure to estimate the τ -th nonparametric conditional
quantile as in [65]. Also as in [65], we choose undersmoothing in the first step, i.e.,
h1 = o(h) and nh1 → ∞ as n → ∞, so that asymptotically the first step estimation
error has negligible effects on the second step estimation, and the asymptotic distribution
of qˆτ (x) remains the same if we replace bˆ(Xt) with b(Xt).
We assume that data {(Xt, Yt)}nt=1 follows a weakly dependent, absolutely regular (β-
mixing) processes. We give a formal definition of an absolutely regular processes now. we
say that {Wt} ≡ {Yt, Xt}nt=1 follows a strictly stationary, absolutely regular process if as
r →∞,
βr = sup
s∈N
E
[
sup
A∈M∞s+r(W)
{|P (A|Ms−∞(W))− P (A)|}
]
→ 0,
where Mts(W) denotes σ(Ws, . . . ,Wt), the sigma algebra generated by (Ws, . . . ,Wt),
for s ≤ t.
To derive the asymptotic distribution of qˆτ (x), we make the following assumptions:
1Here, erf−1(·) is the inverse error function and the error function is defined as erf(x) = ∫ x
0
e−v
2
dv.
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A.1 {Yt, Xt}, t = 1, 2, . . . , n is a strictly stationary absolutly regular process (β-
mixing) with the β-mixing coefficient βr, satisfying β
θ/(2+θ)
r = O(r−2+), for some 0 <
 < 1, 0 < θ ≤ 1/2.
A.2 The idiosyncratic error {εt}ni=1 i.i.d. with zero mean and unit variance.
A.3 Let S be the compact support of the trimming function M(Xt), i.e. M(Xt) 6= 0
if and only if Xt ∈ S, infx∈S fX(x) > 0, infx∈S b(x) > 0.
A.4 qτ (.) ∈ G3, f(.) ∈ G2, a(.) ∈ G3, b(.) ∈ G5, where Gl denotes the class of functions
that are l-times continuously differentiable at x ∈ S.
A.5 The kernel function K(.) is a bounded, symmetric density function, with
∫
K(v)v4dv <∞.
The smoothing parameters satisfying: h1 = O(n−1/5) and h = Oe(n−1/5), so that nh1 →
∞, nh→∞, nh51 → 0, nh6 → 0 as n→∞.
Assumption A.1 assumes that the {Yt, Xt} process is absolutely regular (β mixing)
process with some restrictions on the decay rate of its mixing coefficient βr. This is not
a stringent assumption as discussed in [74]. Assumption A.2 imposes the i.i.d difference
structure on {εt}. Assumption A.3 gives some smoothness and moment conditions, similar
to those given in [65]. Assumption A.4 requires that the density function fX(·) and the
scale function b(·) are both bounded on the trimming set. Assumption A.5 ensures that
the bias of the kernel estimates is of order h2 and imposes some restrictions on the smooth
parameter h1 and h.
The next two propositions give the asymptotic results for the cross validation selected
parameters ηˆ and hˆ defined in (4.2).
Proposition 1. Define η0 =
√
2erf−1(2δ0 − 1) = QN(0,1),δ0 , where δ0 = δ(τ0) such that
QN(0,1),δ0 = Q,τ0 . Let (ηˆ, hˆ) be the value of (η, h) that minimizes the objective function
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CV (η, h), then under assumptions A.1-A.5, we have
ηˆ − η0 = −B11h2 +Op(n− 12 )
where B11 = E [Mtfe,tBLC,tbt] /E[Mtfe,tb2t ], Mt = M(Xt), bt = b(Xt), fe,t = fe(0|Xt)
is the conditional density of et = bt(εt − η0) evaluated at 0 conditional on Xt, BLC,t =
µ2[(1/2)q
′′
t ft + q
′
tf
′
t ]/ft, µ2 =
∫
K(v)v2dv, ft = f(Xt), q′′t = [d
2qτ (x)/dx
2]|x=Xt , q′t and
f ′t are the first derivatives of qτ (·) and f(·) evaluated at Xt, respectively.
Proposition 2. Under the same conditions as in Proposition 2.1, we have
hˆ = (C2/4C3)
1/5 n−1/5 + op(n−1/5),
where
C2 = (1/2)ν0E[Mtfe,tb
2
t/f
2
t ],
C3 = (1/2)E
[
Mtfe,tB
2
LC,t
]− (1/2) (E[Mtfe,tBLC,tbt])2E[Mtfe,tb2t ],
and
ν0 =
∫
K2(v)dv.
The proofs of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 are in Appendix 2.
Proposition 1 implies hat δˆ − δ0 = Op(h2 + n−1/2), by Taylor expansion argument.
Proposition 2 gives that the optimal smooth parameter in the second step has the order
of n−1/5, the same order when the data is identically independently distributed. With
Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, we can derive the asymptotic distribution of τ th direct
nonparametric conditional quantile estimator qˆτ (x) for absolutely regular processes.
Theorem 1. Under assumptions A.1-A.5, the asymptotic normal distribution qˆτ (x) is given
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as follows
√
nh[qˆτ (x)− qτ (x)−B1h2] d→ N(0, V (x))
where
B1 = BLC(x)− b(x)E[Mtfe,tBLC,tbt]/E[Mtfe,tb2t ],
BLC(x) = µ2[(1/2)q
′′
τ (x)fX(x) + q
′
τ (x)f
′
X(x)]/fX(x),
and
V (x) = ν0b
2(x)/f(x).
The proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix 2.
Theorem 1 states that the asymptotic normal distribution of τ th direct nonparametric
conditional quantile estimator qˆτ (x) for the absolutely regular β-mixing processes is the
same as when the data is identically independently distributed. Therefore, the efficiency
gain of direct nonparametric conditional quantile estimator at extreme tail quantiles with
i.i.d data remains hold when the data process is the absolutely regular β-mixing processes,
with its mixing coefficient βr satisfying assumption A.1.
4.1.2 The Local Linear Estimator
One can also estimate the conditional quantile function using the local linear esti-
mation method. The local linear estimator has some advantages over the local constant
estimator such as that it has smaller estimation bias than the local constant estimator at
the boundary region of data support and that it can simultaneously estimate the condi-
tional quantile function qτ (x) and its derivative function q′τ (x) =
∂qτ (x)
dx
. The local linear
55
estimator (qτ (x), q
′
τ (x))
> is given by (qˆτ (x), qˆ
′
τ (x))
> ≡ (αˆ(x), βˆ(x))> as follows:
γˆ(x)
def
=
αˆ(x)
βˆ(x)

= arg min
α,β
1
n
n∑
t=1
[
QN(Yt,bˆ(Xt)),δ − α− (Xt − x)β
]2
Ktx
=
[
1
nh
n∑
s 6=t
X˜stX˜
>
stKst
]−1
1
nh
n∑
s 6=t
X˜stKstQN(Yt,bˆ(Xt)),δ (4.3)
where X˜st = (1, Xs−Xt)>, Ktx = K((Xt−x)/h), the definitions of QN(Yt,bˆ(Xt)),δ, bˆ(Xt)
and δ are the same as defined in Section 4.1.1.
We choose (η, h) by minimizing the following cross-validation objective function
1
n
n∑
t=1
ρτ (Yt − qˆτ,LL,−t(Xt)),
where ρτ (v) = v[1 − 1(v ≤ 0)] is the check function, qˆτ,LL,−t(Xt) = αˆ−t(Xt) =
ι>1 γˆ−t(Xt) is the leave-one-out estimator of qτ (Xt) with ι1 = (1, 0)
>, and γˆ−t(Xt) is
given by
γˆ−t(Xt) =
 αˆ−t(Xt)
βˆ−t(Xt)
 = [ 1
nh
n∑
s 6=t
X˜stX˜
>
stKst
]−1
1
nh
n∑
s 6=t
X˜stKstQN(Yt,bˆ(Xt)),δ,
where X˜st = (1, Xs − Xt)> and Kst = K((Xs − Xt)/h). The asymptotic behaviour of
ηˆLL, hˆLL and the asymptotic distribution of the direct nonparametric local linear estimator
of the τ th conditional quantile estimator γˆ(x) under β-mixing processes are given in the
next two propositions.
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Proposition 3. Under assumption A1-A5, we have
ηˆLL − η0 = B11,LLh2 + op(1)
hˆLL = [C2/4C3,LL]
1/5n−1/5 + op(1)
where B11,LL is defined the same way as in B11 (see Proposition 1) except that BLC,t in
B11 is replaced by BLL,t = (1/2)µ2q
′′
τ (Xt), C2 was defined in the Proposition 2 and C3,LL
is defined the same way as C3 (see Proposition 2) except that BLC,t in C3 is replaced by
BLL,t.
Proposition 4. Under assumptions A1-A5, we have
√
nhDh(γˆ(x)− γ(x)− [BLL(x)−B11,LLmLL(x)]h2) d→ N(02,Σ(x))
We define Dh, BLL(x), mLL(x) and Σ(x) as following:
Dh = (
1 0
0 h
)
BLL(x) = (BLL,1(x), BLL,2(x))
> where BLL,1(x) = (1/2)µ2q′′τ (x) and BLL,2(x) =
(µ4 − µ22)f ′(x)q′′τ (x)/[2µ2f(x)] + µ4q′′′τ (x)/(6µ2)
mLL(x) = (b(x), ξ
′(x)/f(x))> and ξ(x) = b(x)f(x) so that ξ′(x) = b′(x)f(x) +
b(x)f ′(x)
Σ(x) = b
2(x)
f(x)
(
v0 0
0 v2
µ22
) where v0 =
∫
K(v)dv and v2 =
∫
K2(v)v2dv
The Proposition 2.3 and 2.4 can be proved as the same way as the proof of Proposi-
tion 2.1, 2.2 and Theorem 2.1, but by utilizing the nonparametric local linear estimation
arguments as in the proof of Proposition 4.1-4.3 in [65]. Note that as in the i.i.d case, the
nonparametric direct local linear estimator of conditional quantile under β-mixing pro-
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cesses and the nonparametric direct local constant estimator have the same asymptotic
variance. Therefore, the property of efficiency gain at extreme tail quantiles of direct non-
parametric local constant estimator of conditional quantile compared to check function
approach sustains in the local linear estimation approach.
4.2 Simulation
In this section we present a Monte Carlo simulation study for examining the finite
sample performance of our proposed direct conditional quantile estimator. We show both
local constant and local linear estimation results of the proposed direct method results
(‘direct lc’ and ‘direct ll’) and compare them with the traditional check function method
counterparts (‘check lc’ and ‘check ll’). For the check function based method, we select
the bandwidths by minimizing the value of delete-one cross-validated check function.
We consider three location-scale data generating processes (DGPs). The dependent
variable Yt follows a nonlinear AR(1) process. It has location a(Yt−1) = 0.9sin(2piYt−1),
constant scale b(Yt−1) = 1, and error terms are Gaussian, standardized Student-tv, and
χ2v. We de-mean all the distributions. We set the variance of Gaussian to be two and the
degrees of freedom of each Student-tv and χ2v to be five. Thus, the data is generated as
follows:
Yt = 0.9 ∗ sin(2piYt−1) + ut (4.4)
where Y0 = 0 and ut is i.i.d N(0, 2), or tv=5, or χ2v=5.
We use the Gaussian kernel function for the estimation. We replicateM = 1000 Monte
Carlo simulations for each of the sample sizes n = (100, 200, 400). We report the median
values of MSE for τ = (0.01, 0.05, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.95, 0.99) in tables 4.1-4.3. The MSE
is computed by equation (4.5) where qˆτ (Yt|Yt−1) is the pointwise estimated conditional
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quantile of Yt given Yt−1 and qτ (Yt|Yt−1) is the counterpart true value.
MSE =
1
n
n∑
t=2
(qˆτ (Yt|Yt−1)− qτ (Yt|Yt−1))2. (4.5)
The simulation results for Gaussian distributed error terms are reported in Table 4.1.
The results show that the proposed direct method is not only more efficient than the tradi-
tional check method at the extreme quantiles as expected from our theoretical propositions
but also outperform it at the middle quantiles. The results are similar to [65] where they
show for iid data, their proposed method has smaller finite sample estimation MSE for
normally distributed .
Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 give estimation results for Student-t5 and for χ25 distributed .
We observe that our proposed estimator have smaller finite sample median MSE for most
cases than that of the check function based estimators.
Table 4.1: Median 10−2 MSE Values Normal Distribution
Estimator n τ = 0.01 τ = 0.05 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.95 τ = 0.99
direct lc 100 41.24 21.39 14.49 12.4 14.03 23.57 40.23
check lc 100 56.27 28.12 17.3 14.61 16.16 28.58 56.06
direct ll 100 37.98 19.71 12.66 11.72 12.19 19.66 36.73
check ll 100 68.78 32.82 16.82 14.6 16.66 33.95 69.25
direct lc 200 23.64 14.8 8.61 7.59 8.51 14.35 24.97
check lc 200 37.51 18.51 10.48 9.27 10.2 18.03 37.71
direct ll 200 20.4 11.81 7.64 6.74 7.55 11.53 21.4
check ll 200 44.37 20.43 9.92 8.66 10.01 20.36 45.65
direct lc 400 15.51 9.47 5.06 4.36 5.17 9.09 14.96
check lc 400 23.15 12.39 6.39 5.77 6.51 12.09 24.74
direct ll 400 11.88 7.13 4.85 4.47 4.81 7.19 11.88
check ll 400 27.54 12.13 6.24 5.43 6.23 12.53 28.83
In the next section we will compare forecasting performances of our estimator and the
check function based estimator using U.S housing returns data.
59
Table 4.2: Median MSE Values in 10−2 for Student-t Dist.
Estimator n τ = 0.01 τ = 0.05 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.95 τ = 0.99
direct lc 100 68.94 24.6 11.84 9.38 11.68 24.36 68.1
check lc 100 109.95 32.86 13.06 10.73 13.45 33.13 107.54
direct ll 100 67.97 21.06 9.22 8.31 9.56 19.81 62.17
check ll 100 125.01 38.13 11.72 9.12 11.66 38.6 125.15
direct lc 200 41.92 16.93 7.7 5.82 7.75 16.27 41.5
check lc 200 75.03 21.72 8.86 6.82 8.7 21.39 72.64
direct ll 200 39.67 12.46 5.8 5.2 5.88 12.93 39.04
check ll 200 94.44 24.27 7.41 5.8 7.25 24.06 93.64
direct lc 400 28.65 11.06 4.75 3.79 4.8 11.07 26.96
check lc 400 50.11 14.75 5.55 4.36 5.45 14.74 47.79
direct ll 400 22.84 7.91 4.08 3.51 3.99 7.5 21.67
check ll 400 64.9 15.69 4.91 3.72 4.65 15.65 61.64
Table 4.3: Median MSE Values in 10−2 for Standardized χ25 Dist.
Estimator n τ = 0.01 τ = 0.05 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.95 τ = 0.99
direct lc 100 3.9 2.22 1.79 2.27 3.9 11.82 24.19
check lc 100 4.22 2.35 2.12 3.02 4.96 14 35.48
direct ll 100 1.75 1.33 1.27 1.57 2.33 6.95 18.94
check ll 100 2.85 1.51 1.38 2.03 3.97 14.37 39.87
direct lc 200 2.54 1.31 1.06 1.25 2.27 6.58 16.25
check lc 200 2.56 1.39 1.26 1.76 3.06 8.19 23.82
direct ll 200 1.04 0.84 0.82 0.97 1.44 3.58 11.2
check ll 200 1.48 0.84 0.88 1.24 2.27 8.62 28.51
direct lc 400 1.31 0.8 0.64 0.75 1.31 3.87 9.56
check lc 400 1.44 0.83 0.76 1.06 1.7 5.33 14.71
direct ll 400 0.69 0.54 0.49 0.6 0.9 2.27 5.34
check ll 400 0.76 0.47 0.51 0.75 1.32 5.28 17.51
4.3 An Empirical Application
The 2008 economic recession that emerged from a series of subprime mortgage crisis
has reflected the significant impact of housing market on financial markets and even the
entire economy. Given the fact that the global economy is still struggling in recovering
from last recession and owning a home being an sizable part of private households net
wealth [76], better methods of forecasting the movements of housing price returns are es-
sential in understanding the implications of housing market on economy. Even though the
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vast majority of the existing works focus on forecasting the mean value of housing prices
with traditional parametric methods [77, 78, 79, 80], forecasting the conditional quantiles
is more helpful in understanding the risks of housing market by offering a comprehensive
future housing prices distribution. Since it is extremely challenging to efficiently esti-
mate the price serial correlation of infrequent traded assets with parametric method, our
proposed direct nonparametric method fits this study well.
We consider forecasting the U.S housing return quantiles. The data is from a publicly
available dataset, S&P/Case-Shiller House Price Indices. It is a national representative and
widely quoted data. In addition, the financial derivatives on this index have been traded at
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange since May 2006. [81] thoroughly discussed the value
and importance of such products.
Home Price Index covers periods from January, 1975 to December, 2015. For this
study, we focus on monthly frequency data. As we can see from Figure 4.1, the housing
index data fully captures the major phenomenons of U.S housing market. The housing
prices were going high from the beginning of early 2000s, declined sharply during 2008
recession and recovered after 2010. We denote the housing index observations as It and
housing return as yt which is defined as
Yt =
It − It−1
It−1
. (4.1)
The dependent variable to be forecasted is the home price return, yt, and the inde-
pendent variable is one month lag of home price return, yt−1. We keep a fixed win-
dow of in-sample size of 240 observations and roll the in-sample estimation window
forward till the last available observation on December, 2015. The in-sample estima-
tion starts from January, 1975 and first forecast begins at January, 1995. We forecast
the quantiles at τ = (0.05, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.95) with proposed direct method by equa-
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Figure 4.1: Housing Index Return
tion (4.2) for local constant version and equation (4.3) for local linear version. The
δ and bandwidth are selected by minimizing the cross-validation function of equation
CVi(δ, h) =
1
n
∑240+i
t=1+i ρτ (Yt− qˆδ,h,−1(Yt−1))M(Yt−1) with n = 240 where ρτ is the check
function ρτ (v) = v(τ − I(v ≤ 0)) and bˆ(Yi) is estimated by calculating the square root of
E(Y 2t |Yt−1)− [E(Yt|Yt−1]2.
qˆτ (Yt|Yt−1) = arg min
α
t−2∑
i=t−242
{QN(Yi+1,bˆ(Yi)),δ − α}2Kh(Yi, Yt−1). (4.2)
qˆτ (Yt|Yt−1) = arg
α
{ min
γ=(α,β)
t−2∑
i=t−242
{QN(Yi+1,bˆ(Yi)),δ − α− (Yi − Yt−1)β}2Kh(Yi, Yt−1)}.
(4.3)
For illustration purpose, we compare our proposed direct quantile model with the tra-
ditional check function based model and linear conditional quantile model. We present
the forecasts of conditional quantiles along with its associated check function values. The
local constant check function method is forecasted by equation (4.4) and the local linear
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version is forecasted by equation (4.5).
qˆτ,lc(Yt|Yt−1) = arg min
α
t−2∑
i=t−242
{ρτ (Yi+1 − α)Kh(Yi, Yt−1)}, (4.4)
qˆτ,ll(Yt|Yt−1) = arg
α
{ min
γ=(α,β)
t−2∑
i=t−242
{ρτ (Yi+1 − α− (Yi − Yt−1)β))Kh(Yi, Yt−1)} (4.5)
First, we look at the conditional quantiles forecasts of local constant version at figure
4.2 for check function method approach and at figure 4.3 for direct method approach. The
diamond line in the figures are housing returns realizations and the solid lines in different
colors are for quantiles of various τ . We can observe from the figures that the direct
method results cover the housing return realizations much better than the check function
results.
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Figure 4.2: Check Function Method-Local Constant
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Figure 4.3: Direct Method-Local Constant
Again, we look at the forecasts of local-linear version at figure 4.4 for check function
method approach and at figure 4.5 for direct method approach. The results are persistent in
the pattern that direct method covers the housing return realizations better than the check
function based method.
The performance of out-of-sample forecasting is evaluated based on the check function
values. The smaller check function values are, the better forecasting results are. We
report the check function values of direct method, check function based method, and linear
method on Table 4.4. As table shows, our proposed direct methods delivers a much more
accurate forecasting results in terms of check function values than conventional check
function method and linear method. In tail regions (τ = 0.05 and τ = 0.95), the direct
results are improved roughly 10% and 5.7% for local constant estimator and 5.3% and
23.3% for local linear estimator comparing to check function method and almost 50% for
both versions of linear method.
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Figure 4.4: Check Function Method-Local Linear
Table 4.4: Window Size: 240; Number of Forecasting: 250
Estimator τ = 0.05 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.95
direct lc 8.96 22.65 28.39 26.35 12.65
check lc 9.95 22.54 28.57 25.84 13.41
direct ll 8.88 22.32 27.28 25.21 12.20
check ll 9.39 22.54 27.85 25.05 15.92
linear 22.89 25.12 27.20 27.99 27.35
For robustness check purpose, we repeat the entire process with an smaller window; a
fixed window of in-sample size of 120 observations. We report the results on Table 4.5.
We found that the result patterns described above are persistent for different forecasting
window sizes.
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Figure 4.5: Direct Method-Local Linear
Table 4.5: Window Size: 120; Number of Forecasting: 370
Estimator τ = 0.05 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.95
direct lc 10.30 28.54 36.36 32.92 14.24
check lc 12.00 28.89 37.24 32.49 14.99
direct ll 9.71 27.44 35.19 31.54 15.94
check ll 10.73 27.71 36.24 31.41 16.16
linear 26.68 31.22 34.46 35.32 33.94
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5. CONCLUSION
In the first essay, we study the housing vacancy rate. It’s challenging to estimate the
housing vacancy rate for the transitional economies since not much historical survey data
is available at developing countries. We propose a novel identification strategy to estimate
the housing vacancy rate by transaction data, which is housing units level electricity data in
this paper. We estimate the housing vacancy rate to be 15.52% showing the high volumes
of vacant properties among Chinese housing market. These vacant properties are more
likely for investment purpose than for housing services since the transaction cost of vacant
properties are much lower than that of occupied ones. Therefore, the vacant houses are
more liquid on the market. Moreover, the large price drops will put further pressure on the
downward pricing trend and eventually affect other sectors of the economy.
In the second essay, we study the phenomenon of demand stickiness. We set up a
structural model to describe the retailer’s profit maximizing process when the consumers
face a re-optimization cost. We propose a method to estimate the magnitude of the demand
stickiness. Although consumer rational inattention has been theorized in the literature
[29, 30], as far as we know, there is no study that has empirically estimated the level of
consumer rational inattention. Using Dominick’s scanner data, our estimation confirms
the existence of demand stickiness, and moreover, we find that for typical consumers,
their re-optimization thresholds are about 10% of the average product price. In addition,
we also examine the effect of demographics on the threshold on demand stickiness. Our
results show that the re-optimizing threshold is positively correlated with the proportion
of hurried shoppers and negatively correlated with the fraction of shoppers with college
degree or above and the average household size. These results support our logic based on
consumer re-optimization cost. In addition, the re-optimizing threshold does not seem to
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vary among stores of different price tiers, or between private labels and national brands.
An important application of demand stickiness lies in dynamic pricing. We propose a
new dynamic pricing strategy that accommodates sticky demand. We conduct a counter-
factual analysis and show that a retailer could see a 1% increase in revenue by taking into
account demand stickiness when dynamically setting prices to clear its inventory. Given
the low margin in the grocery retail industry, this increase in revenue could be significant
for the retailer. In addition, the revenues generated by our new dynamic pricing strategy
are more stable than those generated by the traditional dynamic pricing, which is important
for risk-averse retailers.
In the third essay, we extend the novel method of conditional quantile estimator of
[65] to weakly dependent data case so that applied researchers can apply it to estimate and
forecast conditional quantile functions with time series data. We prove the consistency and
asymptotic normality of our direct nonparametric conditional quantile estimator with β-
mixing data. We show that the efficiency of the direct method by Monte Carlo simulations
and illustrate how to apply the method on empirical data to forecast U.S. housing index.
The proposed method can be widely used in forecasting economics/financial variables and
in risk management analysis. With more efficient and accurate forecasting of financial
variable quantile distributions, researchers may have a comprehensive understanding of
financial variables for future periods.
The proposed estimation method can be further generalized to estimate semiparamet-
ric conditional quantile functions such as estimating a partially linear or a varying coef-
ficient conditional quantile functions. One can also develop model specification tests for
parametric conditional quantile functions. Since the proposed method estimate the tail dis-
tributions more accurately than the conventional check function based method, we expect
test statistics based on the new method have better finite sample performances especially
when testing tail part of a parametric conditional distribution. We leave the investigation
68
of these problems as possible future research topics.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
Proposition. The profit maximizer p∗t for Equation (3.7) is contained by the set of {pt−1 +
A−√A2−B
3β1γ
, pt−1−−A−
√
A2+B
3β1γ
, ct−β0/β1
2
, pt−1−1/γ, pt−1+1/γ} ≡ {p1t , p2t , p3t , pt−1−1/γ, pt−1+
1/γ}.
Proof. First, we want to show that if p1t ∈ (pt−1, pt−1+1/γ), then p1t is the local maximizer
on (pt−1, pt−1 +1/γ). Consider pt ∈ (pt−1, pt−1 +1/γ). The first-order derivative of pi(pt)
is given by
pi′(pt) = β0 + β1(pt−1 + γ(pt − pt−1)2) + 2β1γ(pt − ct)(pt − pt−1) (4.1)
The equation pi′(pt) = 0 has two roots: x1 = pt−1 + A−
√
A2−B
3β1γ
and x2 = pt−1 + A+
√
A2−B
3β1γ
.
Note that B < 0, so
√
A2 −B > |A|. We have x1 > pt−1 and x2 < pt−1. The right
derivative of pi(pt) at pt−1 is given by
lim
pt→pt−1+
pi′(pt) = β0 + β1pt−1 = D(pt−1) > 0 (4.2)
Since pi(pt) is a cubic form in pt, we know that x1 is the local maximizer, while x2 is the
local minimizer. Note that x1 is p1t , so if p
1
t ∈ (pt−1, pt−1 + 1/γ), then p1t is the local
maximizer on (pt−1, pt−1 + 1/γ).
pi(p1t ) > pi(pt), ∀pt ∈ (pt−1, pt−1 + 1/γ) (4.3)
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If p1t > pt−1 + 1/γ, then pi
′(pt) > 0 on (pt−1, pt−1 + 1/γ).
pi(pt−1 + 1/γ) > pi(pt), ∀pt ∈ (pt−1, pt−1 + 1/γ) (4.4)
Second, we want to show that if p2t ∈ (pt−1 − 1/γ, pt−1) and pt−1 > ct, then p2t is the
local maximizer on (pt−1 − 1/γ, pt−1). Consider pt ∈ (pt−1 − 1/γ, pt−1). The first-order
derivative of pi(pt) is given by
pi′(pt) = β0 + β1(pt−1 − γ(pt − pt−1)2)− 2β1γ(pt − ct)(pt − pt−1) (4.5)
The equation pi′(pt) = 0 has two roots: x1 = pt−1 − −A−
√
A2+B
3β1γ
and x2 = pt−1 −
−A+√A2+B
3β1γ
. Note that B < 0, so
√
A2 −B < |A|. Since pt−1 > ct, we have A > 0.
Thus, x1 < x2 < pt−1. The left derivative of pi(pt) at pt−1 is given by
lim
pt→pt−1−
pi′(pt) = β0 + β1pt−1 = D(pt−1) > 0 (4.6)
Since pi(pt) is a cubic form in pt, we know that x1 is the local maximizer, while x2 is the
local minimizer. Note that x1 is p2t , so if p
2
t ∈ (pt−1 − 1/γ, pt−1), then p2t is the local
maximizer on (pt−1 − 1/γ, pt−1).
pi(p2t ) > pi(pt), ∀pt ∈ (pt−1 − 1/γ, pt−1) (4.7)
If p2t < pt−1 − 1/γ, then
max{pi(pt−1 − 1/γ), pi(pt−1)} > pi(pt), ∀pt ∈ (pt−1 − 1/γ, pt−1) (4.8)
Third, we consider pt ∈ [ct, pt−1− 1/γ]∪ [pt−1 + 1/γ,−β0/β1]. In this case, the profit
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function reduces to the following.
pi(pt) = (pt − ct)(β0 + β1pt) (4.9)
The first order condition is given by
pi′(pt) = β0 + β1pt + β1(pt − ct) (4.10)
The solution to pi′(pt) = 0 is x =
ct−β0/β1
2
= p3t . If p
3
t ∈ [ct, pt−1 − 1/γ] ∪ [pt−1 +
1/γ,−β0/β1], then p3t is the local maximizer on [ct, pt−1 − 1/γ] ∪ [pt−1 + 1/γ,−β0/β1].
If p3t ∈ (pt−1 − 1/γ, pt−1 + 1/γ), then
max{pi(pt−1−1/γ), pi(pt−1+1/γ)} > pi(pt), ∀pt ∈ [ct, pt−1−1/γ]∪[pt−1+1/γ,−β0/β1]
(4.11)
In sum, the set of possible global maximizers is {p1t , p2t , p3t , pt−1, pt−1 − 1/γ, pt−1 +
1/γ}. Since limpt→pt−1− pi′(pt) = limpt→pt−1+ pi′(pt) > 0, pt−1 cannot be the global
maximizer. Thus, the global maximizer p∗t is contained by the set of {p1t , p2t , p3t , pt−1 −
1/γ, pt−1 + 1/γ}
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
We will use the following short-hand notation in this Appendix. qτ,t = qτ (Xt),
qˆτ,t = qˆτ (Xt), at = a(Xt), bt = b(Xt), bˆt = b(Xt), ft = f(Xt), fˆ−t = fˆ−t(Xt),
Mt = M(Xt), η = QN(0,1),δ, η0 = QN(0,1),δ0 = Qε,τ , Kts = K((Xt −Xs)/h).
Lemma 4.1. Under assumptions A.1-A.5, we have 1
n2h
∑
t
∑
s 6=t εsKts = Op
(
n−
1
2
)
Proof of Lemma 4.1:
1
n2h
∑
t
∑
s 6=t
εsKts
=
1
n2h
∑
t
∑
s<t
(εsKts + εtKts)
=
1
n2h
∑
t
∑
s<t
H(Wt,Ws)
where H(Wt,Ws) = εsKts + εtKts and Wt = (xt, εt). Let H1(.), sδ, Rn be defined in
the same way as in Lemma B.3 with respect to the above function H(Wt,Ws). By H-
decomposition, we have 1
n2h
∑
t
∑
s 6=t εsKts =
2
n
∑
tH1(Wt) + Rn, where H1(Wt) =
h−1εt
∫
Ktsf(xs)dxs = tf(Xt) + R1t,n, where R1t,n = h−1εt
∫
Ktsf(xs)dxs − tf(Xt).
It is easy to show that n−1
∑n
t=1R1t,n = op(n
−1/2). Hence,
2
n
n∑
t=1
H1(Wt) =
2
n
n∑
t=1
tf(Xt) + op(n
−1/2) =
2
n
n∑
t=1
H1,0(Wt) + op(n
−1/2),
where H1,0(Wt) = tf(Xt). Thus, (2/n)
∑n
t=1H1,0(Wt) is the leading term of
(2/n)
n∑
t=1
H1(Wt).
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Below we will show the second moment of (1/n)
∑n
t=1H1,0(Wt) = O(n
−1). This then
implies that conclusion of the lemma.
E
( 1
n
∑
t
H1,0(Wt)
)2 = 1
n2
∑
t
E
[
H21,0(Wt)
]
+
∑
t
∑
s 6=t
E [H1,0(Wt)H1,0(Ws)]

= n−2 {C1n + C2n} ,
C1n = nh
2
∫
E(ε2t |Xt)f 2(xt)dxt + (s.o.),
= O
(
nh2
)
,
C2n =
∑
t
∑
s 6=t
{∫ ∫
H1,0(wt)H1,0(ws)dF (wt)dF (ws) + CM
1/(1+δ)
n β
δ/(1+δ)
|t−s|
}
= O
(
nh2
)
,
by Lemma B.1, where
Mn = max
{
E
[|H1,0(Wt)H1,0(Ws)|1+δ] , E [|H1,0(W˜t)H1,0(W˜s)|1+δ]} .
One can easily show that Mn = O
(
h2(1+δ)
)
. Also, notice that
∑
t
∑
s 6=t β
δ/(1+δ)
|t−s| = O(n).
Therefore, 1
n2h
∑
t
∑
s 6=t εsKts = Op
(
n−
1
2
)
.
Lemma 4.2. Under assumptions A.1-A.5, we have
A2n
def
= 1
n2h
∑
t
∑
s6=t εtεsKts = Op((nh
1/2)−1) = op ((nh)−1).
Proof of Lemma 4.2: As in the proof of Theorem 3.1 of Fan and Li (1999b), one can
show that E(A22n) = O((n
2h)−1). Hence, A2n = Op((nh1/2)−1).
Lemma 4.3. Under assumptions, we have 1
n2h
∑
t
∑
s 6=tMtfe,tbt(qτ,s − qτ,t)Kts/f(xt) =
B1,0h
2 + op (nh
−1), where B1,0 = E[Mtfe,tBLC,t].
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Proof of Lemma 4.3:
E
[
1
n2h
∑
t
∑
s 6=t
Mtfe,tbt(qτ,s − qτ,t)Kts/f(xt)
]
=
1
n2h
∑
t
∑
s6=t
(∫ ∫
Mtfe,tbt(qτ,s − qτ,t)Ktsf(xs)dxtdxs + CM1/(1+δ)n βδ/(1+δ)|t−s|
)
=
1
n2h
(
n2B1,0h
3 +O
(
nh
2+δ
1+δ
))
= B1,0h
2 + o
(
(nh)−1
)
,
where the second equality is derived based on Lemma B.1, and Mn = O
(
h2+δ
)
.
V ar
(
1
n2h
∑
t
∑
s 6=t
(qτ,s − qτ,t)Kts
)
≈ 1
n4h2
∑
t
∑
s 6=t
∑
s′ 6=t6=s
E
[
(qτ,s − qτ,t)Kts(qτ,s′ − qτ,t)Kts′
]
+
1
n4h2
∑
t
∑
s 6=t
∑
t′ 6=t6=s
E
[
(qτ,s − qτ,t)Kts(qτ,s − qτ,t′ )Kt′s
]
,
where the notation An ≈ Bn means that An = Bn(1 + op(1)), the term with four
summation indices all different from each other in the second moment is canceled from
E{[(n2h)−1∑t∑s 6=t(qτ,s − qτ,t)Kts]2}.
By standard kernel method calculation, we have
E
[
(qτ,s − qτ,t)Kts(qτ,s′ − qτ,t)Kts′
]
= O(h4)
and
V ar
(
1
n2h
∑
t
∑
s 6=t
(qτ,s − qτ,t)Kts
)
= O(h/n).
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Therefore, 1
n2h
∑
t
∑
s 6=tMtfe,tbt(qτ,s − qτ,t)Kts/f(xt) = B1,0h2 + op ((nh)−1).
Lemma 4.4. Under assumptions A.1-A.5, we have 1
n3h2
∑
t
∑
s 6=tMtfe,tb
2
sε
2
sK
2
ts/f
2
t =
2C2
nh
+ op ((nh)
−1).
Proof of Lemma 4.4:
E| 1
n3h2
∑
t
∑
s 6=t
Mtfe,tb
2
sε
2
sK
2
ts/f
2
t |
=
1
n3h2
∑
t
∑
s 6=t
E
[
Mtfe,tb
2
sε
2
sK
2
ts/f
2
t
]
=
1
n3h2
∑
t
∑
s 6=t
{∫ ∫
Mtfe,tb
2
sε
2
sK
2
ts
f(xs)
f(xt)
dxtdxs + CM
1/(1+δ)
n β
δ/(1+δ)
|t−s|
}
=
1
n3h2
(
2C2n
2h+O
(
nh1/(1+δ)
))
=
2C2
nh
+ o
(
(nh)−1
)
,
where C2 is defined in Proposition 2, and Mn = O (h) can be easily checked.
Lemma 4.5. Under assumptions A.1-A.5, 1
n3h2
∑
t
∑
s 6=t
∑
l 6=t6=s(qτ,l − qτ,t)KtlεsKts =
op ((nh)
−1)
Proof of Lemma 4.5
1
n3h2
∑
t
∑
s 6=t
∑
l 6=t 6=s
(qτ,l − qτ,t)KtlεsKts = 1
n3h2
∑
t<s<l
H(Wt,Ws,Wl)
where H(Wt,Ws,Wl) is a symmetric function. By H-decomposition, we have
h2
1
n3h2
∑
t
∑
s 6=t
∑
l 6=t6=s
(qτ,l − qτ,t)KtlεsKts = 3
n
∑
t
H1(Wt) +Rn,
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where
H1(Wt) = εt
∫ ∫
(qτ,s − qτ,l)KslKtldF (xs)dF (xl)
+ εt
∫ ∫
(qτ,l − qτ,s)KslKtsdF (xs)dF (xl).
E
( 1
n
∑
t
H1(Wt)
)2 = 1
n2
{∑
t
E
[
H21 (Wt)
]
+
∑
t
∑
s 6=t
E [H1(Wt)H1(Ws)]
}
= n−2 {C1n + C2n}
Based on the same argument as in Lemma A.1 and Lemma A.3, we can derive that
C1n = C2n = O (nh
8), 1
n
∑
tH1(Wt) = Op
(
n−
1
2h4
)
.
sδ ≤ C sup
t<s<l
{
E|(qτ,l − qτ,t)KtlεsKts|2+δ
}1/(2+δ)
= O
(
h
6+2δ
4+2δ
)
Therefore, Rn = O
(
n−1+
ε
2h
6+2δ
4+2δ
)
. And 1
n3h2
∑
t
∑
s 6=t
∑
l 6=t6=s(qτ,l − qτ,t)KtlεsKts =
Op
(
n−
1
2h2
)
+Op
(
n−1+
ε
2h
6+2δ
4+2δ
−2
)
= op ((nh)
−1).
Lemma 4.6. Under assumptions A.1-A.5,
1
n3h2
∑
t
∑
s 6=t
∑
l 6=t6=s
Mtfe,t(qτ,s − qτ,t)Kts(qτ,l − qτ,t)Ktl/f 2t
= 2C1h
4 + op
(
(nh−1)
)
,
where C1 = (1/2)E[Mtfe,tB2LC,t].
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Proof of Lemma 4.6
E
[
1
n3h2
∑
t
∑
s 6=t
∑
l 6=t6=s
Mtfe,t(qτ,s − qτ,t)Kts(qτ,l − qτ,t)Ktl/f 2t
]
=
1
n3h2
∑
t
E
[
Mtfe,t
f 2t
E
[∑
s 6=t
∑
l 6=t6=s
(qτ,s − qτ,t)Kts(qτ,l − qτ,t)Ktl|xt
]]
E
∑
s6=t
∑
l 6=t6=s
(qτ,s − qτ,t)Kts(qτ,l − qτ,t)Ktl|xt

≤
∑
s 6=t
∑
l 6=t6=s
{∫ ∫
(qτ,s − qτ,t)Kts(qτ,l − qτ,t)Ktlf(xs)f(xl)dxsdxl + CM1/(1+δ)n βδ/(1+δ)|s−l|
}
= B2LC,tf
2
t n
2h6 +O
(
nh
4+2δ
1+δ
)
where BLC,t was defined in Proposition 1.
E
[
1
n3h2
∑
t
∑
s 6=t
∑
l 6=t6=s
Mtfe,t(qτ,s − qτ,t)Kts(qτ,l − qτ,t)Ktl/f 2t
]
= 2C1h
4 +O
(
n−1h
4+2δ
1+δ
−2
)
= 2C1h
4 + o
(
(nh)−1
)
.
By using similar arguments as in the proof of Lemma A.4, one can easily show that
the variance of 1
n3h2
∑
t
∑
s 6=t
∑
l 6=t6=sMtfe,t(qτ,s − qτ,t)Kts(qτ,l − qτ,t)Ktl/f 2t is a smaller
order of (nh)−1.
Proof of Proposition 2.1
Decomposing the objective function CV (η, h) = 1
n
∑n
t ρτ (Yt − qˆτ,−t(Xt))Mt into
three terms as in Racine and Li (2016) as follows
CV (η, h) = CV1 + CV21(η, h) + CV22(η, h)
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where CV1 = 1n
∑n
t ρτ (et)Mt does not depend on η, h. Define
ξ˜t1 = (q˜τ,t − qτ,t)fˆ−t/ft = 1
nh
∑
s 6=t
(qτ,s − qτ,t)Kst/ft,
ξ˜t2 = d˜tfˆ−t/ft =
1
nh
∑
s 6=t
bssKst/ft,
ξ˜t1 = bˇt(η − η0),
where bˇt = b˜tfˆ−t/ft = (nh)−1
∑
s 6=t bsKst/ft. Then similar to the derivations in Racine
and Li (2016), one can show that
CV21(η, h) =
1
n
n∑
t
[ξ˜t1 + ξ˜t2 + ξ˜η,t3]vtMt
= CV21,1(h) + CV21,2(h) + CV21,3(η, h)
where vt = [1[et≤0] − τ ] satisfies E[vt|Xt] = 0.
Based on Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 4.3, CV21,1(h) = op ((nh)−1) and CV21,2(h) =
op ((nh)
−1). And CV21,3 = Op
(
n−
1
2 |η − η0|
)
because of E[vt|Xt] = 0.
Therefore, we have
CV21 = Op
(
n−1/2|η − η0|
)
+ op
(
(nh)−1
)
Following Racine and Li (2016), we have
E[CV22(η, h)|Xt] ≈ 1
2n
n∑
t
Mtfe,t[ξ˜
2
t12 + 2ξ˜t12ξ˜η,t3 + ξ˜
2
η,t3]
= CV22,1(h) + CV22,2(η, h) + CV22,3(η, h)
where fe,t = fe(0|Xt), ξ˜t12 = ξ˜t1 + ξ˜t2.
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Based on Lemma 4.4 to 4.6, we have
CV22,1 =
1
2n
∑
t
Mtfe,t
[
(q˜τ,t − qτ,t)2 + 2d˜t(q˜τ,t − qτ,t) + d˜2t
]
fˆ 2−t/f
2
t
= CV22,1,1 + CV22,1,2 + CV22,1,3
= C1h
4 +
C2
nh
+ op
(
(nh)−1
)
where
q˜τ,t = (nh)
−1∑
s 6=t
qτ,sKst/fˆ−t,
d˜t = (nh)
−1∑
s 6=t
dsKst/fˆ−t
and
fˆ−t = (nh)−1
∑
s 6=t
Kst.
Based on Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.4, we have
CV22,2 =
1
n
∑
t
[Mtfe,t(q˜τ,t − qτ,t + d˜t)fˆ−t/ft]ξ˜t,3
= B1,0h
2(η − η0) +Op
(
n−1/2|η − η0|
)
where B1,0 = E[Mtfe,tBLC,tbt].
CV22,3 =
1
2n
∑
t
Mtfe,tξ˜
2
t,3 = B2,0(η − η0)2
where B2,0 = (1/2)E[Mtfe,tb2t ].
Therefore, we have
CV22(η, h) = C1h
4+
C2
nh
+B1,0h
2(η−η0)+B2,0(η−η0)2+Op
(
n−1/2|η − η0|
)
+op
(
(nh)−1
)
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CV (η, h) = CV21(η, h) + CV22(η, h)
= C1h
4 +
C2
nh
+B1,0h
2(η − η0) +B2,0(η − η0)2
+Op
(
n−1/2|η − η0|
)
+ op
(
(nh)−1
)
.
Minimizing objective function CV (η, h) with respect to η gives
ηˆ − η0 = −B1,0h
2
2B2,0
+Op
(
n−1/2
)
= −B11h2 +Op
(
n−1/2
)
where B11 = E[Mtfe,tBLC,tbt]/E[Mtfe,tb2t ].
Proof of Proposition 2.2
CV (η, h) = C1h
4 +
C2
nh
+B1,0h
2(η − η0) +B2,0(η − η0)2
+Op
(
n−1/2|η − η0|
)
+ op
(
(nh)−1
)
= C3h
4 + C2 (nh)
−1 + op
(
(nh)−1
)
the last equality is derived by substituting ηˆ − η0 = −B11h2 + Op
(
n−1/2
)
into function
CV (η, h).
C3 = C1 +B2,0
(
B1,0
2B2,0
)2
− B
2
1,0
2B2,0
= C1 − 1
4
B21,0
B2,0
=
1
2
E
[
Mtfe,tB
2
LC,t
]− 1
2
(E[Mtfe,tBLC,tbt])
2
E[Mtfe,tb2t ]
.
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Minimizing CV (h) with respect to h gives
hˆ ≈ (C2/4C3)1/5 n−1/5
Proof of Theorem 2.1
qˆηˆ,bˆ(x)− qτ (x) =
mˆ(x)
fˆ(x)
,
where
mˆ(x) = (qˆηˆ,bˆ(x)− qτ (x))fˆ(x)
=
1
nh
∑
t
[
at + bˆtηˆ + btεt − qτ (x)
]
K
(
Xt − x
h
)
=
1
nh
∑
t
[at + btηˆ − btη0 + btη0 + btεt − qτ (x)]K
(
Xt − x
h
)
+ (s.o.)
=
1
nh
∑
t
[qτ (Xt)− qτ (x)]K
(
Xt − x
h
)
+
1
nh
∑
t
[bt(ηˆ − η0)]K
(
Xt − x
h
)
+ (s.o.)
= mˆ1(x) + mˆ2(x)
= A1 + A2 + A3 + A4
where A1 = E[mˆ1(x)], A2 = mˆ1(x) − E[mˆ1(x)], A3 = E[mˆ2(x)], A4 = mˆ2(x) −
E[mˆ2(x)].
It is easy to show that
A1 = f(x)BLC(x)h
2 + op
(
h2
)
,
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E[A22] =
1
nh
ν0b
2(x)f(x) + o (nh)−1 ,
where BLC(x) is defined in Theorem 1 and ν0 =
∫
K2(v)dv.
A3 =
1
nh
∑
t
E
{
bt(ηˆ − η0)K
(
Xt − x
h
)}
= −B11b(x)f(x)h2 + op
(
h2
)
where B11 =
E[Mtfe,tBLC,tbt]
E[Mtfe,tb2t ]
.
A4 = op (nh)
−1
Since fˆ(x) = f(x) + op(1), therefore, we have
E[qˆηˆ,bˆ(x)− qτ (x)] =
[
BLC(x)− E[Mtfe,tBLC,tbt]
E[Mtfe,tb2t ]
b(x)
]
h2 + o
(
h2
)
,
and
V ar[qˆηˆ,bˆ(x)] =
1
nh
ν0b
2(x)
f(x)
+ o (nh)−1 .
Hence, we obtain
√
nh[qˆηˆ,bˆ(x)− qτ (x)−B1h2] d→ N(0, V (x))
where B1 =
[
BLC(x)− E[Mtfe,tBLC,tbt]E[Mtfe,tb2t ] b(x)
]
, and V (x) = ν0b
2(x)
f(x)
.
B.1 Appendix B
This Appendix presents some useful lemmas that are used for the proofs given in Ap-
pendix A.
92
Lemma 4.7. Let gn(x1, x2) be a Borel function such that
∫
R2q
|gn(x1, x2)|1+δdF1,1+j(x1, x2) ≤Mn
and ∫
R2q
|gn(x1, x2)|1+δdF (x1)dF (x2) ≤Mn
for some δ > 0 and Mn > 0. Then
|
∫
R2q
gn(x1, x2)dF1,1+j(x1, x2)−
∫
R2q
gn(x1, x2)dF (x1)dF (x2)|
≤ 4M1/(1+δ)n βδ/(1+δ)(j)
Proof: This is Lemma 1 of Yoshihara (1976).
Lemma 4.8. Let Wt ∈ Rr be a strictly stationary, β-mixing process with coefficient βm.
Let φ(·, ·, ·) be a symmetric Borel measurable function defined on Rr ×Rr ×Rr such that
Mn3 = max{
∫
R3r
|φ(x1, x2, x3)|1+δdFi1,i2,i3 (x1, x2, x3),
∫
R3r
|φ(x1, x2, x3)|1+δdF (x1)dF (x2)dF (x3)}
Mn12 = max{
∫
R3r
|φ(x1, x2, x3)|1+δdF (x1)dFi2,i3 (x2, x3),
∫
R3r
|φ(x1, x2, x3)|1+δdF (x1)dF (x2)dF (x3)}
for all 1 ≤ i1 < i2 < i3 ≤ n.
Then
E
[∑∑ ∑
1≤i1<i2<i3≤n
φ(Wi1,Wi2,Wi3)
]
= O(n3E[φ(W˜i1, W˜i2, W˜i3)]) +O(n
2M
1/(1+δ)
n12 ) +O(nM
1/(1+δ)
n3 ),
where {W˜t} is an independent process that has the same marginal distribution as the
depdendent process {Wt}.
Proof: This is Lemma 2 of Fan and Li (1999a).
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Lemma 4.9. Let Wt ∈ Rr be defined as in Lemma 4.8 and let
Un,k =
n
k

−1 ∑
1≤t1<t2<...<tk≤n
H(Wt1 , ...,Wik)
be a k-th order U-statistic. Define H1(w1) =
∫
Rr(k−1) H(W1, ...,Wk)
∏k
i=2 dF (wi) and
Rn = Un,k − θ− (k/n)
∑n
t=1[H1(Wt)− θ], where θ =
∫
Rrk
H(W1, ...,Wk)
∏k
i=1 dF (wi).
Further assume that βδ/(2+δ)n = O(n−2+) for some δ,  > 0. Then
Rn = Op(n
−1+/2sδ),
where sδ = sup1≤t1<t2<...<tk≤n(E|H(Wt1 , ...,Wtk)|2+δ)1/(2+δ).
Proof: This is Proposition 2 of Denker and Keller (1983).
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